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The Arab Spring spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and what started in 
hope quickly devolved into struggles for formal and informal power. Violence in Libya 
was intensified by institutions’ inabilities to maintain governance, contain violence, and 
quell the rise of armed groups. Power in Libya is in constant contention by opportunistic 
tribal and regional militias, Islamist groups, and government and military power brokers. 
Libya is on the verge of becoming a failed state; allowing Libya to fail will have 
local, regional, and international repercussions. The challenge is to understand why the 
loosely formed alliances between government and tribal, regional, and Islamist militias 
are falling apart. The introduction of the Islamic State in Libya increases the urgency for 
these disparate groups to resolve their differences. 
This thesis concludes that Gaddafi nurtured a sentiment of distrust between the 
people, Islamists, and government institutions. This trust deficit in post-revolutionary 
Libya has stymied cooperation and progress. Any meaningful solutions will have to 
address the core issue of social trust, the emergence of the Islamic State, and economic 
weakness before reconciliation or reforms can occur. 
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I. LIBYA: A CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT IN A FAILING 
STATE 
Beginning in December 2010, the Arab Spring spread throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and marked a period of hope for the region. However, as 
quickly as it came, the Arab Spring subsided, and what little hope remained devolved into 
violent struggles for formal and informal power. The chaos that ensued affected every 
country in a different manner. Some countries, like Egypt and Algeria, had well-
established institutions available to quell further violence and prevent civil war; others, 
like Libya, had far weaker institutions that were significantly less capable of ensuring 
peace. Libya appears to be on the verge of becoming a failed state; allowing Libya to fail 
will have local, regional, and international security implications.  
A. THE THREAT 
Internally, a revolutionary fervor has seized grassroots organizations; tribally 
aligned militias have been co-opted by the government to serve as a quasi-security 
apparatus; criminal networks exploit the chaos; violent Islamists claim territory and push 
for the establishment of a fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia; and political, military, 
and local leaders vie for power. 
Regionally, a failed Libya will present a vector by which terrorist organizations 
can project power. Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took advantage of the chaos 
following Muammar Qaddafi’s fall from power to raid ammunition depots near Benghazi 
and Ajdabiyah, where they obtained large amounts of heavy munitions—most notably, 
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM).1 Algeria, Egypt, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Tunisia are actively preparing defenses, instituting 
policies to minimize the impacts of potential spillover, and providing assistance (of 
questionable value). 
1 Ricardo Rene Laremont, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the 
Sahel,” African Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 255. 
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Internationally, Western powers are hesitant to intervene, though second- and 
third-order effects have already been experienced. Operation Serval was launched by the 
French to quell a joint Islamist and Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali—a situation for 
which the fall of Colonel Gaddafi served as a direct precursor, and arguably a catalyst.2 
Meanwhile, the multinational coalition that was formed to battle the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) may get drawn into Libya if Islamists continue to claim Libyan territory 
in the name of ISIS.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
What is driving political instability in Libya, and how is a faltering Libyan state 
contributing to regional and international insecurity? In the wake of the Arab Spring, 
Libya has plunged into civil war. Governmental, tribal, and terrorist networks are 
capitalizing on opportunities wrought by the general chaos, causing ripple effects within 
local, regional, and international communities. If regional associations and the 
international community have an interest in preventing Libya’s failure, what measures or 
policies can be taken to reverse this trend?  
Research into Libya’s status is relevant for three reasons. First, the implications of 
a failed Libya have had, and will continue to have, negative effects on regional and 
international security interests. Second, the characteristics of the Libyan state are by no 
means unique. Libyan governance is patriarchal, comprising purposely weak institutions 
and displaying a strong sense of tribalism—characteristics seen through much of the 
developing world. Finally, violent Islamist organizations are enforcing their program, 
raising fears that Libya will become not only a “‘breeding grounds of instability, mass 
migration, and murder’…[but also] reservoirs and exporters of terror.”3 Researchers 
correlate some or all of these attributes with failing or failed states elsewhere. This thesis 
contributes a case study and cautionary tale to the literature on state failure and extremist 
organizations in the Middle East and around the world. 
2 Yehudit Ronen, “Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the Eve of the ‘Arab Spring’ and in its Aftermath: an 
Anatomy of Changed Relations,” The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 4 (2013): 554-555. 
3 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 128.  
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND SCOPE 
This research is designed as a process trace. The research uses a historical 
narrative to describe Libya’s layers of social, political, and economic complexity. Using 
this method, one can discover a great amount of detailed research from which to derive a 
true understanding of the complex Libyan environment. 
Three primary analyses are performed. The first, presented in Chapter II, consists 
of a historical study of the evolution of post-colonial Libya—specifically, of the state of 
Jamahiriya. This chapter examines vital decisions made by Gaddafi and how they 
influenced the organization and operation of Jamahiriya, and asks to what extent the 
problems vexing Libya before the Arab Spring carried over to post-revolutionary Libya.  
Chapter III analyzes the contemporary environment, from the fall of Gaddafi in 
late 2011–2014. A combination of scholarly journals and open-source media are used to 
identify critical changes pre- and post-revolution. The chapter is divided into sections on 
the political environment and on Libyan armed factions. Illuminating the allegiances of 
armed groups is a critical step in parsing the true nature of the instability and power 
struggle within Libya. 
Chapter IV focuses on the fallout of some of the major historical and 
contemporary decisions described in chapters II and III, presents conclusions, and makes 
recommendations for future engagement, aiming at local solutions and ways regional and 
international actors can aid political stability. The objective is to gain a newfound 
understanding of the sociopolitical landscape and to tailor responses to the specific case 
of Libya.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review focuses on failed state theory and its potential applications 
to the situation in Libya. The purpose is to highlight issues surrounding the failed state 
label, how countries have overcome state failure, and potential roles for the international 
community. This section is divided into the following four topics: defining a failed state; 
indicators of a failed state; failed states and insecurity; and conflict resolution.  
 3 
1. Defining a Failed State 
State failure is not a new phenomenon, but deserves increased attention. Before 
globalization, weak states had fewer implications for regional and international security. 
That dynamic has changed, and today “preventing states from failing, and resuscitating 
those that do fail, are thus strategic and moral imperatives.”4 A good procedure for 
examining state failure is first to explore the precursors of failure, next examine how 
failed states contribute to global insecurity, and finally to analyze the lessons from states 
that have already failed. It is important to begin by defining what are strong, collapsed, 
weak, and failed states. 
The differences between a strong and a collapsed state are summed up by the 
ability of government to provide political goods. These difficult-to-measure political 
goods are demanded by citizens as part of the social contract, from providing security to 
“tolerance of dissent.”5 Strong states are capable of securing their territory, providing the 
people with high-quality public goods, maintaining lines of communication, and 
providing and funding health and education programs.6  
Collapsed states, on the other hand, offer no such public goods. These states are 
void of any authority, aside from communal authority or ad-hoc arrangements, and are “a 
mere geographic expression.”7 Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Somalia are a few commonly 
referenced collapsed states that have suffered internal insecurity due to local 
powerbrokers who compete to expand their power by any means necessary—often in the 
form of violence or illicit activities such as smuggling. Despite the spiral of anarchy that 
follows the collapse of a failed state, these states can overcome their collapsed status with 
a modicum of governance. The difficulty arises when authority becomes so greatly 
diffused to powerbrokers that re-centralizing power becomes an unpalatable concept to 
4 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 127.  
5 Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” 
in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 2-3.  
6 Rotberg, “Failure and Collapse,” 4. 
7 Ibid., 9. 
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the new elites, because it requires them to relinquish some of their own newly obtained 
power. 
Weak states are defined as “states in crisis…[that] may be inherently weak 
because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints.”8 Weak states 
often have domestic problems centering around ethnicity, language, or religion, but not to 
the point of violence. Weak states typically experience some form of public-goods 
degradation if they fluctuate between strong and weak. An autocracy is considered a 
weak state despite its monolithic appearance, due to the low number and quality of public 
goods offered its population.9 
Finally, a failed state is “a state in anarchy…that is no longer able or willing to 
perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world.”10 Failed states 
have little ability to control their territories; elites and security apparatus that extort or 
oppress the citizenry; and a system in which public goods are either purposefully 
withheld or impossible for the state to deliver. Additionally, visible gaps in the security 
apparatus invite the expansion of illicit markets. The increase in lawlessness becomes a 
vector for criminal organizations to exploit through protection rackets and introduces new 
weapons and drugs into the state. The inability of the state to project power to its 
peripheries enables freedom of movement for illicit gangs and armed groups.11  
These definitions of strong and collapsed states are relatively straightforward and 
raise minimal controversy; however, the terms “failed” and “weak” (as well as other 
terms not mentioned, such as “fragile,” “failing,” “troubled,” and “under stress”) are 
criticized as too broad. One common critique is that an overly broad conceptualization of 
failed states encourages the “aggregation of very diverse sorts of states and their 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Rotberg, “Failure and Collapse,” 4-5. 
10 Ibid., 5-6.  
11 Ibid. 
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problems” because too many indicators are used to identify a failed state—in brief, too 
many states qualify for the weak and failed state label.12  
The Fund for Peace (FFP) organization is criticized for its aggregation of state-
failure data and application of that data to a large number of states. Its quantitative 
analysis lumps diverse groups together, and the danger in this occurs when policy 
recommendations are made using a “one-size-fits-all ‘state-building’ answer to ‘failed 
states,’” ultimately “enhancing the capacity of military and police and judiciaries when 
these are instruments of repression, corruption, ethnic discrimination, and/or organized 
crime” and potentially serving to conflate their problems.13 However, this critique of 
failed-state theorists and the FFP is slightly biased. The FFP does incorporate qualitative 
analysis into its assessments of failed states and is not as cookie-cutter as some suggest.  
Robert I. Rotberg, former director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict 
Prevention and Conflict Resolution, has received similar criticism, but Rotberg would 
agree with some of his critics. Rotberg explains that “Zimbabwe is an instructive case” 
that shows how “miscreant leaders,” such as Mugabe, can abuse “quiet diplomacy” 
offered by the United States and United Nations to further their own agendas and repress 
the citizenry.14 Rotberg contends that sanctions and public denouncement of Mugabe 
came far too late. He explains that addressing predatory leaders and states in earnest, and 
not passively through quiet diplomacy, would obviate the need to dedicate United 
Nations (UN) resources in support of these areas.15 
A better critique of the failed-state framework identifies the problem as failed 
institutions, not failed states. This perspective allows for more precise policies to address 
specific issues in government, whereas before, empirical measurements were made based 
on desired outcomes, making “it impossible for researchers to understand the nature of 
12 Charles T. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State,’” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1494-
1495. 
13 Call, “Fallacy of the Failed State,” 1496-1497. 
14 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 135.  
15 Ibid., 137. 
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the relationship between state failure and these outcomes.”16 For example, the FFP index 
may look at the security-apparatus category and use indicators such as rebel activity, 
internal conflict, and fatalities, but these all pertain to desired outcomes. A paradigm shift 
to looking at institutional weakness would allow an analyst to delve into indicators of 
institutional weakness such as whether the military is being paid, police have the right 
equipment, and the infrastructure can connect security forces with underdeveloped areas. 
A holistic approach geared towards prescribing solutions for failed states in a precise 
manner is not a concept that is lost on failed-state scholars, but rather, a concept that fails 
to translate well, given the definition of weak state and failed states. 
This paper addresses the weakness of Libya in terms of institutional weaknesses 
whenever possible. This approach allows for unique findings that, in turn, suggest direct 
recommendations rather than a generic solution to a set of pre-determined indicators. 
This is not to say that other research on state failure is of negligible value; in fact, quite 
the opposite. Indicators obtained from organizations like FFP can illuminate which public 
goods are not being delivered—which can direct focus to a specific institution. Finally, it 
is important to remember that even though Libya has entered a period of civil conflict, it 
is not yet a failed state. Its institutions, however weak, do exist and do attempt to provide 
public goods. 
2. Indicators of Failed States 
Weak and failed states are often the victims of their history, whether because of a 
political culture that developed as a result of colonial governance or from having been 
Cold War pawns, or other reasons. Some countries are debilitated through poor or self-
interested leadership, as was the case with presidents Mobutu of Zaire/Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Barre of Somalia. A country’s historical and cultural 
context sets the stage for its economic and political trajectory. In general, the economies 
of weak and failed states tend to be patriarchal and favor the elites and those closest to 
them. Corruption rises to the forefront, money is laundered in foreign banks, and social 
16 Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, “Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State: Bringing the State 
Back In,” Third World Quarterly 34, no.8 (2013): 1324. 
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services go unfunded and eventually dwindle away. Politically, “leaders and their 
associates subvert prevailing democratic norms, coerce legislatures and 
bureaucracies…strangle judicial independence, block civil society, and gain control over 
security and defense forces” leading to a state operating without consent or consensus.17 
The combination of economic and political maleficence results in a loss of legitimacy, 
and the only recourse left to a people is to mobilize along pre-existing lines, generally 
tribal, ethnic, religious, or communal.18  
The Fund for Peace argues that every incident that devolves into a revolution or 
humanitarian crisis stems “from social, economic, and political pressures that have not 
been managed by professional, legitimate, and representative state institutions.”19 The 
quantitative analysis provided by FPP is grounded in qualitative research, based on 
twelve indicators of state failure and categorized under social, economic, and political 
and military pressures. Under social indicators, the four subgroups include group 
grievances, human flight and brain drain, refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), and demographic pressures. Economic indicators for state failure include uneven 
economic development, poverty, and economic decline. Finally, political and military 
indicators fall into six subcategorizes: state legitimacy, public services, human rights and 
rule of law, fractionalized elites, security apparatus, and external intervention. The 
organization produces a fragile-states index (FSI), which ranks countries based on the 
twelve indicators for fragile states and can produce valuable trend data, such as “in the 
2012 index, Libya set a record for the most severe year-on-year worsening of a country in 
the history of the index (a record that still stands), rising from 50th to 11th as the civil 
war’s effects took hold.”20 The ability to use these indicators and examine records 
historically is critical for policymakers examining whether a country is trending towards 
stability or failure.21 
17 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 128-129.  
18 Ibid., 128-130.  
19 “The Methodology Behind the Index,” The Fund for Peace, http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology.  
20 J.J. Messner, “Failed States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State” The Fund for 
Peace, June 24, 2014, Washington, DC, http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-overview.  
21 “The Methodology behind the Index,” The Fund for Peace. 
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Another method of looking at state failure is through institutional failure. 
Institutions are an important component of everyday life, but lack influence in weak and 
failed states. Administrative, judicial, security, and political institutions can be measured 
by observing staffing processes (hiring, firing, and promotions); judicial transparency and 
autonomy; security-force training, funding, and civilian control. Another important factor 
is whether political institutions have checks and balances between the branches of 
government, whether parliament members are chosen based on merit or loyalties, and 
whether political institutions participate in budget making and approval. Some leaders 
intentionally make institutions weak to keep potential rivals at bay. As an example, 
Muammar Gaddafi purposely made military hierarchy, ranks, and assignments 
ambiguous and arbitrary, which caused chaos regarding mission and purpose, confusion 
among the ranks regarding superiority, and plain ineffectiveness.22  
Daniel C. Esty examined the 40-year period between 1955 and 1994 and derived 
three indicators of a state’s failure and collapse: (1) a closed economic system rather than 
one open to international trade, (2) high infant mortality, and (3) lack of democracy. Esty 
used the infant mortality rate as a correlation to quality of life, but later concluded that 
GDP per capita was a more salient metric.23  
Another look at indicators of state failure is broken into three categories: 
economic, political, and level of violence. The economic indicators include leaders who 
are unwilling to reverse downward economic conditions, but prefer to line their coffers 
and those of their patrons. This leads to shortages in food, health, and education and 
eventually creates a vector for organized crime. Political indicators are similar—
strongmen marginalize bureaucratic institutions, coerce the legislature, and promote 
patronage. Finally, increases in tribal violence, civil war, and, most importantly, upsurges 
in civilian combat deaths are cause for concern. Predicting the future using these 
variables can be troublesome. One cannot predict imminent state failure or collapse based 
22 Ezrow “Bringing the State Back,” 1326-1333. 
23 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” in State 
Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rothberg, (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2003), 20.  
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on a total number of civilian deaths per capita, nor does a specific number exist that 
correlates a percentage drop in GDP with state failure.24 
The menu of indicators for failed and weak states is long and at times vague. 
Nevertheless, these indicators and symptoms help direct research to the root of the 
problem, whether it lies with an institution, leader, or policy. As is the case with Libya, 
one can find the concept of social capital subsumed in the theories of state failure. Social 
capital, when achieved, is “defined as shared norms that promote cooperation between 
two or more individuals…by fostering trust and reducing the incentive to cheat.”25 In 
2009, Libya ranked 118th out of 185 countries on the Social Capital Achievement Index, 
but in 2012 it dropped to 135 out of 185.26 Both the 2009 and the 2012 scores were 
unfavorable and help to establish that a lack of social cohesion existed in Libya before 
the Arab Spring revolution; the lack of cohesion may not be due to the post-revolutionary 
violence.  
Social capital is a broad field of study, but two important components of it are 
social trust and social norms. Social trust and norms describe why groups adopt certain 
attitudes and perceptions. Social trust can encompass everything from confidence in 
institutions (legal, social, and public), economic markets, and trust in people; it suggests 
that in order to increase social cooperation, a group must extend its trust beyond its 
immediate circle of trust.27 Similarly, social norms are telling of a society’s outlook 
because they are grounded in the idea reciprocity, or that “actions towards others will be 
returned in the future” and, as a result, will “reduce the incentive to cheat.”28 One of 
many social norms in Libya is the desire to smuggle subsidized goods to neighboring 
markets, which indicates a lack of trust in the economic institutions and the authority of 
the government.  
24 Ibid., 21-22. 
25 Dan Lee, Kap-Young Jeong, and Sean Chae, “Measuring Social Capital in East Asia and Other 
World Regions: Index of Social Capital for 72 Countries,” Global Economic Review 40, no. 4 (2011): 385. 
26 Stephen B. Young, Noel Purcell, and Davlet Babajanov, “Social Capital Achievement: 2012 
Country Rankings,” Pegasus 3, no. 4 (2013): 17. 
27 Lee, “Measuring Social Capital,” 389, 406. 
28 Ibid., 390. 
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3. Failed States and Insecurity 
Weak and failed states are feared as havens for illicit, violent, and ungoverned 
areas capable of funneling, funding, and training some of the most brutal violent 
extremist organizations (VEO). The second- and third-order effects of these states impact 
local, regional, and international policies. A “ruler’s personal survival is often at odds 
with the task of building strong state agencies,” which explains why “President Mobutu 
has manipulated and coopted illicit trade to finance his power, intervened in ethnic battles 
to promote allies, and claimed” international aid to build stronger ties internally and 
externally.29 Decisions based on the self-preservation of rulers often do more harm than 
good to a state and invite greater local, regional, and international insecurity. 
Militias often arise as alternatives to state security and can serve as stabilizing 
agents for short periods of time, but the longer they are allowed to engage in security 
activities, the more embedded and necessary they become to civil society—and thus the 
more counterproductive to state building. Three types of militias can be distinguished, 
based on their political aims. The first category is local security providers (LSPs)—local 
strongmen who maintain order in their own areas and step in when the government is 
unwilling or incapable of providing political goods locally. Second are emergency 
militias (EMs), which form in response to an outbreak of civil war and are used by all 
sides. Competition militias (CMs), the third category, are a byproduct of democratic 
competition. CMs are used by political elites to gain power, control, and votes.30 All of 
these militia types can be found in Libya; however, the most common are the CM and 
LSP. 
When militias form along ethnic, tribal, or local lines and attack one another, the 
international community tends to dismiss the violence as internal and contained, and 
therefore a matter for the sovereign state to manage; this is called retribalization.31 Weak 
29 William Reno, “War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa’s Weak States,” 
Comparative Politics 29, no. 4 (1997), 494-495.  
30 Clionadh Raleigh, “Pragmatic and Promiscuous: Explaining the Rise of Competitive Political 
Militias Across Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution published online (July 3, 2014): 3. 
31 Raleigh, “Pragmatic and Promiscuous,” 21.  
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and failed states are at great risk for internal insecurity when “a state’s territory dissolves 
into competing ethnic fiefdoms using violence as a means to legitimate separation.”32 An 
example of how militias can threaten internal security is seen with the Congolese Militia 
Rally for Congolese Democracy–Movement for Liberation (RCD–ML), which may be 
categorized as an EM in response to the second Congo War. The RCD–ML assumed 
roles typically associated with the state, such as tax collection and maintenance of roads, 
but what started as a regulatory power metastasized into something more predatory in 
nature as they proved unwilling to legitimize and work through the established 
government.33 Sometimes militias do not deteriorate into localized criminal elements, as 
was the case with the Bakassi Boys of Nigeria, who started as an LSP and slowly evolved 
into a CM. The Bakassi Boys filled a gap in security, were well accepted by the 
population overall, and were even at times openly supported by the government. They 
were banned only in response to international pressure.34  
Weak and failed states raise regional and international concerns because 
“international security relies on states to protect against chaos at home and limit the 
cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world.”35 Criminal 
organizations look towards weak and failed states with the inability to enforce laws 
because it means “low cost for producing and distributing illegal goods and services,” 
cheap criminal labor, and the ability to buy off state officials.36 Once established, these 
organizations may form alliances with transnational drug organizations, terrorist groups, 
and illegal markets—each subverting the legitimacy of the government. Historically, 
failed states have suffered “porous borders, high rates of civilian casualties…[and] all 
remain on the humanitarian watch list as potent sources of displaced persons and 
refugees.”37 
32 Ibid. 
33 Kate Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States: Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in 
Africa,” Development and Change 43, no. 5 (2012): 1085-1089.  
34 Ibid., 1092-1095. 
35 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 130. 
36 James Cockayne, “Chasing Shadows,” The RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (2013): 13. 
37 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 133. 
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IDPs can become a significant internal, regional, and international problem, as in 
Somalia. In the late 1980s, the “Siad [Barre] regime became infamous for its bald 
manipulation of numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons,” so much that the 
international community provided funding, which became a “steady source of income to 
Siad’s corrupt regime.”38 In the early 1990s, IDPs caught in the middle of an internal 
struggle between Aideed and Barre were starved, prevented from returning home to 
Mogadishu, and were so shut off from humanitarian help that the international 
community was forced to intervene.39 During the Rwandan genocide in 1994, “the most 
devastating illustration of ‘refugees as vectors of violence’ occurred in eastern 
Congo...when 1.2 million Hutu refugees poured across the border,” and, of that, over 
100,000 were armed militia members.40 The Rwandan response was pre-emptive strikes 
against the refugee camps; soon after, the Mobutu regime imploded.  
4. Conflict Resolution and Potentials for Recovery: DDR and SSR 
Security during a state’s recovery is essential for sustained growth and success. 
Since Libya is a state in conflict, it is relevant to examine programs that are specific to 
conflict-resolution strategies. Two such programs are disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) and security-sector reform (SSR). 
DDR is achieved through demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs), 
which push for combatants to drop their arms and rejoin society. The DRP requirements 
for success are: (1) political will, (2) profiling of ex-combatants and their families, (3) 
transparency within the system, and (4) funding.41 Neutral partners, such as the UN, are 
essential for ensuring successful implementation of disarmament, as was seen in Eritrea, 
38 Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?” in 
State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rothberg, (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institute Press, 2003), 138.  
39 Clarke and Gosende, “Somalia,” 146-147.  
40 Rene Lemarchand, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo: From Failure to Potential 
Reconstruction,” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rothberg, 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 36. 
41 Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 171.  
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East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Chad. The demobilization stage removes ex-combatants 
and segregates them from the population until they are reinserted as civilians. The 
reintegration aspects of DRP ensure that an ex-combatant has money, food, and 
sustainment material to survive as a civilian and that the new location is suitable for both 
the ex-combatant and his family. Child soldiers can require additional steps to socialize 
back into a community, because of their learned indifference to human life.42  
DDR operates in parallel with the justice process, and this becomes particularly 
important should the justice system be transitional (one created in support of conflict 
resolution). Law enforcement and justice are “largely backwards looking, but with 
forward-looking goals” and address “past abuses in ways that are expected to satisfy a 
range of needs—of the society, of victims, of state institutions, and the rule of law.”43 At 
the heart of the conflict between DDR and the justice system is striking a balance where 
combatants feel safe reintegrating, and not fearful of imminent prosecution. A method of 
creating accountability is to involve the International Criminal Court to ensure, at 
minimum, that the most heinous violations of law (e.g., genocide and crimes against 
humanity) will be prosecuted. Other methods explored have been truth commissions to 
make the evolution of those events that led to violence public knowledge, and reparations 
to families that have experienced loss.44 
SSR is predicated on the assumption that every nation desires a professional 
military. The West has invested greatly in this concept. Before progress can be made in 
other areas of state development, a country must first be able to provide security before 
other public goods. Such is not always the case, and what emerges is the “concept of 
partnership between stakeholders who do not share the same values and aims.”45 Another 
goal of SSR is to change the civil–military relationship in such a way that the military is 
accountable to the civil sector, which can lead to a new social contract. This social 
42 Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,” 172-177.  
43 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, “DDR and Transitional Justice: Bridging the Divide,” 
Conflict, Security, and Development 9, no. 4 (2009), 458.  
44 Ibid., 458-461. 
45 Olaf Bachmann, “Civil-Military Relations in Francophone Africa and the Consequences of a 
Mistaken Analysis,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 3 (2014), 608. 
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contract is important, particularly in the African context where “the military [culture] 
was…shaped according to the needs of the ruling elites and their foreign patrons…[and] 
became a control mechanism for the personal rule system, with its own internal clientelist 
dynamic.”46 This same culture takes little interest in professionalization training, but 
gladly accepts materiel support. A third objective under SSR is to unify ongoing, 
disparate initiatives—for example the EU, United States, UN, and AU provide a common 
approach to training militaries. Finally, regional security improvements have been placed 
high on the SSR docket, but efforts to align strong northern African countries with less-
capable neighbors has had mixed success.47  
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis finds that the major source of instability in Libya is a trust deficit that 
has grown since Gaddafi ingrained in the heads of every Libyan not to trust political 
parties, Islamists, or institutions. This mistrust has carried over into post-revolutionary 
Libya. 
Libya’s inability to control its own territory following the death of Gaddafi was a 
direct result of the system of governance Gaddafi implemented, known as jamahiriya. 
Due to substantial income from oil, the Gaddafi regime was able to use funds to 
implement a strong patronage network, ensure that bureaucratic institutions remained 
weak, and empower tribal and local leaders to typical governmental services such as rule 
of law. Fundamentally, jamahiriya strengthened the centralized power of Gaddafi and 
diffused remaining authority at the lowest levels of society, which resulted in the 
marginalization of political elites who might otherwise have challenged Gaddafi’s rule. 
The fall of Gadhafi as Libya’s strongman and purveyor of the patronage network left a 
power vacuum, in which government institutions were too weak to provide security to the 
population, and from a more pragmatic standpoint, unable to provide security for Libya’s 
natural resources. 
46 Bachmann, “Civil-Military Relations in Francophone,” 608. 
47 Bachmann, “Civil-Military Relations in Francophone,” 608-622. 
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Libya’s weak institutions led to two destructive situations: first, the co-opting of 
tribal militias by the interim government to provide security for population centers and 
major resources; and second, the rise of opportunistic tribal militias and spread of internal 
violence. Islamist organizations are an amalgamation of these two scenarios. They tend to 
be tribally heterogeneous; they were at times co-opted by the government; and they are 
opportunistic. Furthermore, the inability of Islamist organizations to align with a major 
tribe for logistical or operational support and their nature has led some Islamist 
organizations, such as the Abu Mahjen Battalion, to acquire resources through criminal 
means, such as kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery of money transports.48  
Regional Islamists contend that the Arab Spring is a pan-Arab movement that 
proves the people of the Middle East do not want a secular country, and furthermore, 
shows the reluctance of the West to intervene as proof that the West cannot be trusted.49 
Violent Islamist groups within Libya, such as Ansar al Sharia, continue to struggle for 
control of government structures and territory nationally and refuse to accept any form of 
governance other than a fundamental interpretation of Sharia. In early September 2014, 
the Islamist militant group Jaish al-Islam urged the people of Dernah to support ISIS.50 
Less than a month later, the group Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (Islamic Youth Shura 
Council) proclaimed the controlled territory in Dernah for the caliphate of the Islamic 
State (IS).51 
The struggle between formal and informal power was evident throughout the 42 
years of Gaddafi rule and the three years post-revolution. The remainder of this thesis 
takes a closer look at the factors broached above, to assess the best means by which to 
stabilize Libya and prevent its failure. 
48 Rafaa Tabib, “Stealing the Revolution: Violence and Predation in Libya,” NOREF: Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Resource Center, October 2014, 6.  
49 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the ‘Arab Spring’ Within the 
Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 35, no.12 (2012): 831-848.  
50 Khalid Mahmoud, “Libyan Militants Call on Derna Residents to Join ISIS,” Asharq Al-Awsat 
http://www.aawsat.net/2014/10/article55337286. 
51 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State’s First Colony in Libya,” The Washington Institute: Policy 
Watch 2325, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-first-colony-in-
libya, October 10, 2014.  
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II. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 
The rise and fall of Muammar Gaddafi is the context for the situation that Libya 
finds itself in today. This survey begins with Libya in the early 20th century, during 
Italian colonial rule, and concludes with the events immediately following the 17 
February Revolution. The first section explores Libya under colonial rule, as a newly 
independent state, and ends with the September 1, 1969 coup that allowed Muammar 
Gaddafi to seize power. The second section covers the brief period between 1969 and 
1977 that can be described as Gaddafi’s contemplative period, where he slowly put into 
practice his theories of governance and codified these theories as The Green Book. The 
final section covers Libya as the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
(SPLAJ) under Gaddafi and concludes with the February 17, 2011 revolution, offering a 
political, social, and economic perspective. This historical review identifies systemic 
institutional weaknesses and trends and helps explain the system of jamahiriya, and how 
the very system so strongly championed by Gaddafi led ironically to his demise.52  
A. FROM ITALIAN COLONIAL RULE TO GADDAFI’S COUP 
The period beginning with Italian colonial rule through Gaddafi’s coup is marked 
with political and institutional successes and failures. This period begins with Italian rule, 
is then followed by Libyan Independence and the establishment of a monarchy, and 
finally the coup which eventual led to Gaddafi coming to power. The decisions made 
prior to Gaddafi’s rise to power, particularly the implementation of a dual court system 
and the wests involvement in Libya’s security and economic affairs, fomented the 
foreign, economic, and domestic policy approaches Gaddafi would pursue for the 
subsequent four decades of rule.      
 
52 Alia Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” The Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 4 (2011): 605.  
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1. Italian Rule 
Italy ruled over modern Libya from 1911–1942; however, at the time, there was 
no unified Libya, but three states: Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania (see Figure 1). The 
Italians incorporated a three-tiered judicial system. The lowest courts were peace 
councils, which were headed by tribal elders and resolved local disputes. The next level 
was the Islamic courts, which settled personal matters. The highest level of court was 
state administered and manned by an Italian judge. The courthouses were located where 
Italy had a presence—i.e., the cities had more state-administered courts because that was 
where most Italians were, whereas, the rural areas were dominated by local and Islamic 
law. This decision to have a mixed legal system consisting of sharia and statutory law 
effectively struck a balance in the transition from Ottoman to Italian rule; however, the 
existence of special tribunals for the defense of the state (STDSs) began a pattern of 
repression that would carry through to the Gaddhafi regime.53  
 
Figure 1.  Map of the Three Libyan States54  
53 “Trial by Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya,” International Crisis Group: Middle East/North 
Africa Report no. 140 (2013): 8. 
54 Red State Eclectic, accessed February 2, 2015, 
http://redstateeclectic.typepad.com/.a/6a00d83452719d69e2014e86db2d25970d-pi  
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STDS were established to combat anticolonial resistance in an efficient manner. 
Military officers were given the authority to issue “on-the spot verdicts, mainly death 
sentences and forced deportation, with no right of appeal.”55 This type of repression, 
where criticism of the ruling party was viewed as treason, is the same policy that 
Gaddhafi later implemented. In 1931, the courts wrongfully sentenced a man by the name 
of Umar al-Mukhatar to death and as a consequence produced a folk hero; his image is as 
iconic now as it was then.56 Similarly, it was the repression of a journalist named Fathi 
Terbil that ignited the February 12, 2011 revolution.  
The Italians were divisively defeated in Libya during World War II, and power 
was relinquished to the Allies. The British established the British Military Administration 
(BMA) to govern Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and provide control of strategic sea- and 
airports. The French gained control of Fezzan in the south, which complimented their 
existing interests in Chad, Niger, Tunisia, and Algeria. Finally, the United States 
established an air-force base near Tripoli, for the purposes of countering Soviet 
expansion.57  
2. Independence: United Kingdom of Libya 
The trifecta of Western powers in Libya proposed the Bevin–Sforza Plan in May 
1949, which called for a trusteeship lasting ten years; however, this plan was rejected by 
the UN, which pushed for Libyan independence. King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-
Sanusi, who led forces alongside the British against the Italians, was made the monarch 
of the United Kingdom of Libya on December 24, 1951. King Idris’s goals were to 
restore “societal forces that were crushed by occupation” and promote political 
“participation and representation” by all members of society in clubs, associations, and 
unions. In 1963, he approved women’s suffrage.58  
55 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 8. 
56 Ibid., 8-9.  
57 Yehudit Ronen, “Britain’s Return to Libya: From the Battle of al-Alamein in the Western Libyan 
Desert to the Military Intervention in the ‘Arab Spring’ Upheaval,” Middle Eastern Studies 49, no. 5 
(2013): 677. 
58 Zahra Langhi, “Gender and State-Building in Libya: Towards a Politics of Inclusion,” The Journal 
of North African Studies 19, no. 2 (2014): 201.  
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Idris had two tribal powerbases from which he drew legitimacy: the Sa’adi tribes 
in Cyrenaica and the Sufi-based Sanusiyyah tribes, who obtained their ideology from 
Sanusi’s dynastic religious predecessors. The Sanusiyyah were located in the east, which 
centralized power for the monarchy in Cyrenaica. Despite the tribal support Idris 
acquired, it was not enough to force centralized state rule over the tribal infrastructure, 
and as a result the United Kingdom of Libya was not strongly cohesive, but a federalist 
system with Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fezzan retaining significant autonomy.59  
Western focus on economic and security interests in the area did not subside after 
independence, but took a new direction. The new country suffered from a weak economy 
and relied heavily on foreign investment. In July 1953, Great Britain and the United 
Kingdom of Libya entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which was written 
to last 20 years and allow the British to stage forces in Libya in return for protection from 
third parties.60 France and the United States also took advantage of the opportunity to 
help the young country while securing their own national interests, both economic and 
counter-Soviet.  
King Idris attempted to consolidate the religious courts with the state courts, but 
this effort was met with protest. The people demanded separate religious and state courts 
and the system reverted to the dual-court system. Though Libya had to import judges 
from neighboring countries (due to paucity of legal expertise), the period between 1952 
and 1969 is still idealized for the judiciary’s ability to be independent, effective, and 
fair.61 The trust that people had in the rule of law would change 180 degrees with the 
introduction of oil and Gaddafi.  
A series of contextual events led to Kind Idris’s isolation from the West. First, on 
October 25, 1961, Libya made its first oil shipment to the West, and as oil revenues 
increased, reliance on Western investment decreased.62 Another factor was neighboring 
Egypt, whose president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, espoused a pan-Arabic unity and was 
59 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 611-612.  
60 Ronen, “Britain’s Return to Libya,” 678. 
61 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 10. 
62 Ronen, “Britain’s Return to Libya,” 679. 
 20 
                                                 
gaining momentum throughout North Africa. The final reason was the Six-Day War 
between Israel and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). This left King Idris with the 
impossible choice of having a bad economy, a bad relationship with the West, or a bad 
relationship with the Islamists. Idris chose to cease oil exports to the West, and the 
British were kicked out of the country.63 
3. Gaddafi’s Coup 
Of the many tribes in Libya, the three primary are the Gadhadhfa (from Sebah and 
Sirte), the Warfalla (spread throughout the country), and the Merghara (in and around the 
Sebha region).64 Coincidently, Muammar Gaddafi was a member of the Gadhadhfa tribe; 
he was born in Sirte, raised in Sebah, and attended high school in Misrata. His early years 
created relationships with people who would become lifelong supporters from both 
Tripolitania and Fezzan, and in a regional context, events taking place in Egypt (the Suez 
Canal crisis and Nasser’s call for a pan-Arabia) would inform young Gaddafi’s 
worldview. Upon finishing high school, he attended a military academy in Benghazi and 
“his classmates from Sebha and Misrata joined him there, where they formed the nucleus 
of the Free Unionist Movement.”65  
Since independence, King Idris had been able to develop critical infrastructure 
(such as schools and hospitals), protect his people, and form alliances with some of the 
most powerful countries in the world—all while heading one of the poorest nations in the 
world.66 By 1969, the political context had changed and, to further exacerbate the 
deteriorating situation, Idris was eighty years old and removed from much of the decision 
making. On September 1, 1969, while the king was out of the country, the Free Unionist 
Movement executed a bloodless coup on the platform of “social justice, socialism, and 
63 Ibid. 
64 Geoffrey Howard, “Libya’s South: The Forgotten Frontier,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 11 (2013): 13. 
65 Mary-Jane Deeb, “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” in The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 6th ed., ed. David E. Long, Bernard Reich, and Mark 
Gasiorowski, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2011), 430. 
66 Ibid., 428. 
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unity.”67 Muammar Gaddafi was appointed the leader of the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), a prominent, but not an executive, position in the new government. In 
December 1969, the Prime Minister (PM) and cabinet were accused of conspiring against 
the regime; they were subsequently removed from power and control of Libya shifted to 
the RCC and, more specifically, to Gaddafi. 
Each predecessor of Gaddafi established fundamental principles for governing 
Libya. The Italians and the British had sufficient rule of law and functioning courts to 
allow Islamic and state courts to operate side by side. Idris understood the importance of 
Western foreign direct investment in Libyan markets and the importance of civil society 
as it pertains to representation, equality, and fairness. Gaddafi would soon forget the 
lessons learned by his predecessors. 
B. SETTING THE STAGE FOR JAMAHIRRIYA (1969–1977) 
Libya had never used a formal legal document to administer and govern the 
people. Thus, Article 37 of the 1969 temporary constitution specified that the new regime 
would write a constitution. Gaddafi rejected this idea, because he claimed that self-
serving men create constitutions to be used as “the instrument of government…to control 
and manipulate the people.”68 Instead he focused his efforts on emulating his neighbor to 
the east, Gamal Nasser. 
1. The West Departs Libya 
The new Arab Socialist Union, as it was called, was heavily influenced by the rise 
to power of Egyptian Gamal Nasser and his pan-Arabic nationalism. Gaddafi chose to use 
“heavy doses of fiery rhetoric” that poised him as the “defender of the weak against the 
strong, thriving on the idea of standing up to the West” and the principles of pan-Arabic 
nationalism.69 This mentality would set the stage for the first years of power. 
67 Ibid., 429. 
68 Matteo Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution’ through Transformation of the Jamahiriyya 
into a State of Exception,” Middle East Critique 22, no. 2 (2013): 117. 
69 “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya,” International 
Crisis Group: Middle East/North Africa Report no 107 (2011): 7. 
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Gaddafi’s first order of business was to provide freedom, socialism, and unity—
and the only way to achieve this was “to eradicate ‘all residual signs of Western 
colonialism’ and to liquidate Western military bases.”70 The Western business presence 
and security-force presence were seen, at least at the outset, as mutually beneficial to both 
Libya and the West. Nevertheless, they were asked to leave Libya shortly after Gaddafi 
took power. 
To Gaddafi’s dismay, Libya needed the help of the West, particularly with the 
extraction of oil; Libya simply did not have the technology and skill to sustain its oil 
production, which provided “almost 99 percent of Libya’s revenues and constituted all of 
its exports.”71 Libya allowed many Western oil companies to remain until late 1971, 
when it nationalized foreign equipment, adding to an already tense relationship between 
Gaddafi and the West. Gaddafi provided support to the Irish Republican Army and during 
the Arab–Israeli War enacted an oil embargo as a sign of protest. Finally, in an effort to 
sever any remaining ties with the West, he developed a relationship with the Soviet 
Union.  
2. Judicial Reform 
Rule of law is fundamental to any modern and legitimate society. Libya, both as a 
colony and an independent nation, had experimented with many forms of court system. 
Italian reliance on customary tribal or religious courts in the rural areas and state courts in 
urban areas had, for the most part, performed efficiently. However, Italian repression of 
the society through the STDS prevented the people from expressing frustrations without 
fear of persecution. King Idris, by contrast, attempted to consolidate sharia courts with 
the state courts, but met resistance, and soon afterwards, separated the courts once again. 
Gaddafi’s moves to reform the court system reflected mistakes similar to those of his 
predecessors.  
Context is important in understanding the first move of Gaddafi with regard to 
changing the judiciary. Following the September 1, 1968 coup, the courts continued to 
70 Ronen, “Britain’s Return to Libya,” 680. 
71 Ibid.  
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operate independently of the RCC, meaning they were impartial and not susceptible to 
coercion. The RCC went so far as to attempt to pass laws that restricted the ability of 
courts to adjudicate and make them more accountable to the government, but these 
attempts were unsuccessful. To gain more control over the courts, Gaddafi established 
“people’s courts,” also referred to as special courts. Special courts served a purpose 
similar to that of the STDS: to seek out and punish threats against the regime. The 
primary targets of these courts were former supporters of the monarchy, arrested for 
suspicion of enticing public unrest. In the end, over 200 people were prosecuted, some in 
absentia, and sentenced to death, including King Idris. These special courts lasted until 
the turn of the 21st century, but not without criticism for their tremendous reach into 
public discourse.72 
Religious courts were also subject to reform. Gaddafi’s personal views of Islam 
dictated how religious scholars could interpret the Quran. One of his most influential 
beliefs was that the Sunna (the words of the Prophet and his actions) were to be omitted 
from Islamic jurisprudence.73 This is significant because most schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence rely on the Sunna to add context to Quranic verses. Gaddafi charged 
religious jurists with ensuring that state laws were in good keeping with sharia, then 
“downgraded the role of the ulama (religious scholars), making them consultants to the 
courts rather than allowing them to issue binding decisions on the application of 
Sharia.”74 Finally, Gaddafi combined the two court systems (religious and state) into one 
state run court. 
3. Political Reform 
Two types of political structures—informal and formal—emerged following the 
September 1, 1969 coup. The informal structure consisted of a patronage network that 
included Gaddafi’s family, childhood friends who created the Free Officers Union, 
members of his tribe, and a cadre of ideologically aligned believers who were given 
72 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 11-12. 
73 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 615.  
74 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 6. 
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assignments to the revolutionary committees (RC).75 These two groups were the core 
support of the Gaddafi regime, executing the limited governance that would be 
established and ensuring no challenges to power arose.  
Libya’s formal political structure under Gaddafi was based on the people’s 
committees. Qaddafi’s Green Book, a three-volume conceptualization of politics, 
economics, and universal truths, codifies Qaddafi’s thoughts on labor, privatization, 
trade, and how the state must control all these.76 Figure 2 is a diagram of the authority of 
the people, as seen by Gaddafi. In this direct democracy, the general public is responsible 
for holding a basic popular congress, which can be equated with a large town-hall 
meeting that reports directly to the cabinet. 
75 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 607-608. 
76 Deeb, “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” 429. 
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 Figure 2.  The Authority of the People77 
Gaddafi saw self-government as dangerous, and went so far as to outlaw political 
parties, dissidence, and even representation, because “the mere existence of a parliament 
means the absence of the people, but true democracy exists only through the participation 
of the people, not through the activity of their representatives.”78 Notwithstanding the 
political apathy that such a philosophy enforces, Gaddafi called for mass participation by 
the people as they passed through each stage of the political process until the “will of the 
masses is implemented.”79 Just as a parliament could not represent a people, a political 
party could not represent the masses, and they were therefore banned from participating 
in government. A 1972 law stipulated that “anyone involved in any group activity based 
77 “Direct Democracy: The secret of the Effectiveness of Peoples’ Resistance to Imperialism,” Libyan 
Free Press, https://libyanfreepress.wordpress.com/2012/05/05/direct-democracy-the-secret-of-the-
effectiveness-of-peoples-resistance-to-imperialism/. 
78 Muammar Al Qadhafi, The Green Book: Part One The Solution of the Problem of Democracy, 
trans. Unknown (London, United Kingdom: Martin Brian and O’Keeffe, 1976), 9. 
79 Popular Protest,” ICG, 7. 
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on any ideology opposed to the principles of the revolution is liable to [be] executed for 
treason.”80 Prohibiting political parties and denying the need for representation in 
parliament prevented any one person from ascending to challenge Gaddafi’s rule.  
Another instance of Gaddafi’s preventing institutions from becoming too strong 
was in his outlook on security institutions. He believed that citizens could police 
themselves and refused to focus on professionalizing the military. He stated that any 
organization that believes it can administer the law is a police state or dictatorship, and 
that in a democracy the responsibility for “supervision should be carried out by the whole 
society.”81  
Gaddafi’s The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory pointedly states that “it 
is an undisputed fact that both man and woman are human beings…[and] are equal as 
human beings;” however, he continues to explain that the phrase “‘there is no difference 
in any way between men and women’ deprives women of her freedom.”82 He argues that 
for women to be truly free, certain jobs, positions, and educational levels must not be 
available, because it prevents them from performing their motherly duties. This is 
significant not only because it helps illustrate Gaddafi’s character and social perspective, 
but because women are at the forefront of protest in Libya today.  
Muammar Gaddafi successfully reformed the judicial system and religious and 
political establishments in a few short years. By 1977, the Great Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was officially established. Gaddafi’s patronage network and 
ideologues would come to serve him well in the next stages of Libyan history.  
C. JAMAHIRIYA 
Jamahiriya literally translates to “the state of the masses,” and what Muammar 
Gaddafi envisioned was a state in which every citizen had a voice, and that voice was 
heard. Unfortunately, what he espoused and the reality he imposed were two starkly 
80 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 7. 
81 Qadhafi, The Green Book:Part One, 35. 
82The Green Book Part Three: The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory, Accessed February 06, 
2015. http://www.mathaba.net/gci/theory/gb3.htm. 
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different things. The people of Libya were not free to express their opinions and lived 
under repression, particularly if they could be perceived as anti-Gaddafi. The socialist 
institutions that were meant to provide goods and services to the population were 
intentionally suppressed or mismanaged to ensure no one sector of government became 
too powerful. This oil-rich country, with a small population, could not provide jobs for 
the majority of its population, which provokes the question, why not? The answer is that 
he continued the practices of the previous eight years (1969–1977) by filling key 
governmental positions with loyalists and ideologues, subverting key institutions like the 
judiciary, and alienating potential international and domestic allies such as the West, 
religious elements, and non-Arabs.  
In this section, the SPLAJ will be examined on the political, economic, and social 
fronts. The government’s inability to address key issues throughout Gaddafi’s tenure is 
discussed, including international relations and domestic, religious-based conflict. The 
period covered is approximately 1977 (the establishment of the SPLAJ) to February 17, 
2011 (the beginning of the revolution).  
1. Political Front 
Early in the revolution, the international scene played a significant role in the 
shape that Libyan international politics would take. As was mentioned, Egyptian 
president Gamal Nasser was an inspiration to Gaddafi, particularly his pan-Arabic 
approach to regional politics. Despite his affinity for the Egyptian president, however, 
following the Arab–Israeli War, Gaddafi removed himself from Nasser’s sphere of 
influence. Libya found a regional ally in Tunisia and at times was able to work well with 
Chad and Algeria. Meanwhile, Gaddafi’s alienation from the West and embracement of 
the Soviets increased tensions. Gaddafi allowed the Soviet Union to emplace radars along 
the Egyptian border. This increased friction between the two states and resulted in an air 
campaign by Egypt to prevent the surveillance of Egyptian bases. The relationship 
between Egypt and Libya continued to ebb and flow for some time.83  
83 Deeb, “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” 440-441. 
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The first significant coup attempt against Gaddafi’s new regime occurred in 1975, 
by Islamists, and subsequently dozens more were attempted; but each time they were 
suppressed because of Gaddafi’s ability to maneuver “between the three institutions in 
Libya that made up the basis of his support: the Libyan army, the General People’s 
Congress and the revolutionary committees.”84 Colonel Gaddafi was an expert 
manipulator of these institutions, as well as of the judiciary and the international 
community. Impressively, he remained in power for four decades, though he technically 
held no official position in government.  
In 1978, Gaddafi resigned from political office and became Libya’s ideological 
guide, although in practice he was indeed the head of state. He named himself “Brother 
Leader” and sought to “portray himself…as a [strategic] thinker” and a Bedouin 
embodying the “traditions of honour and courage” for the sake of the struggling 
masses.85 The system of jamahiriya attempted to obviate the bureaucracy by empowering 
the citizenry; however, it created a myriad of congresses and committees, which allowed 
Gaddafi to “maintain a sense of orchestrated chaos…to ensure that no one institution can 
become too powerful” and furthermore to ensure that no one person or intuition was ever 
held accountable.86 This lack of accountability permitted him to shift blame to the 
masses, the intuitions, or the state, as desired. A good example of this chaos in action is 
seen in the implementation of security forces.  
a. Libyan Security Institutions  
Gaddafi posits in his first Green Book that “‘Society is its own supervisor.’ Any 
pretension by any individual or group that it is responsible for law is dictatorship. 
Democracy means the responsibility of the whole society, and supervision should be 
carried out by the whole society.”87 In other these words, he placed the onus of security 
on the people—a public good that nearly every nation understands in its social contract as 
84 Francois Burgat, “Gadhafi’s Ideological Framework,” in Qadhafi’s Libya: 1969 to 1994, ed. Dirk 
Vandewalle, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 60. 
85 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 8. 
86 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution’,” 118-119.  
87 Qadhafi, The Green Book: Part One, 35. 
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the responsibility of the state. Gaddafi flipped the social contract around, and in 
empowering the population, preempted potential challenges to power by weakening the 
security forces. Gaddafi did not trust the officer corps and “frequently re-shuffled its 
leadership” to keep it weak, turning to “a network of overlapping militias” from the 
Gadhadhfa, Warfalla, and Magharha tribes to perform security duties.88  
The actual military suffered from poor professionalization, outdated or ill-
maintained equipment, and overall lack of leadership. Positions within the military were 
not only shuffled around to the extent that service members did not know their bosses and 
supervisors did not know their subordinates, but were assigned based on tribal and 
personal affiliations with Brother Leader. Following the 1993 coup attempt by a 
combination of Islamists and military members, Gaddafi ensured that no promotions 
would be made beyond his own “rank” of colonel. The problems surrounding the police 
forces were similar to those of the armed forces: lack of discipline, equipment, and 
training. Aside from Gaddafi’s personal revolutionary-guard force, the police and armed 
forces were primarily used to achieve political goals, not to secure the territory and the 
citizens. The use of the military to further political aspirations is a characteristic that 
carried over into the 17 February revolution.89  
b. Libyan Revolutionary Committees  
The revolutionary committees served as an “ideological vanguard of the masses, 
whose function concerned the conscientization of the population.”90 The RCs emerged as 
a result of apathy among the population, and more specifically for one of two reasons: 1) 
lack of participation within the people’s committees or 2) to prevent tribal elders from 
advocating solely for their tribe’s interests. Initially, the RCs were not created to exert 
authority; however, as time went on, they could possess a considerable amount of 
authority. Furthermore, since Libya did not have a constitution (due to Gaddafi’s 
88 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 614.  
89 Florence Gaub, “A Libyan Recipe for Disaster,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, no. 1 
(2014): 104-105. 
90 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution’,” 116. 
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abhorrence of man-made laws) the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the RCs were 
never officially defined.91  
As RCs became more prominent, so too did their powers. First, the leaders within 
the RCs were typically ideologues or staunch supporters of Gaddafi, earning them 
Gaddafi’s trust. These ideologues were positioned perfectly to derive maximal benefit 
from a convoluted economic system, where they were able to profit immensely from 
reselling subsidized goods. Loyalty and wealth allowed them to ensure that revolutionary 
ideals were spread throughout Libya. The RCs authorized assassinations between 1980 
and 1987. The killings first targeted Islamists (violent and nonviolent), then Libyans 
living abroad in countries such as Italy, Germany, and England. All were seen, in the 
broadest sense of the term, as enemies of the revolution. This became a pivotal point, at 
which the formal system of congresses and committees and the informal system of the 
RCs competed for authority. The RCs became so powerful that they could block 
decisions made by the formal systems (in the name of the masses) and still “control 
schools, universities, factories, media and especially the army and the police.”92 The RCs 
also worked closely with judicial institutions.93  
c. The Judiciary  
The judiciary underwent several changes and additions throughout Libya’s 
history. Gaining momentum in the early 1980s, RCs were authorized to arrest enemies of 
the state and manage detention facilities. Judges were appointed without any legal 
training and internal services could keep prisoners in jail after their sentence was served. 
This trifecta of the RCs, internal services, and an untrained judiciary system created a 
type of police state resembling the Italian STDS—even military courts were brought in 
and to preside over civil disputes. The shift from independent courts to bodies responsible 
to Gaddafi’s internal service exacerbated the corruption within the system. Judges 
91 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution,’” 116-117. 
92 Ibid., 117-118. 
93 Ibid. 
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admitted to taking bribes and quid-pro-quo deals and performing arbitrary court 
proceedings—the corruption did not depart greatly from the people’s court system.94  
2. Economic Front 
Looking from a purely economic standpoint, one might conclude that Libya has 
the potential of being very successful. It is rich in oil and natural gas, has a relatively 
small population, and is centrally located, with access to waterways, the Middle East, 
North Africa, and Europe. But despite all this, Libya has never been economically well 
off. This phenomenon is referred to as Dutch disease (or more commonly as the resource 
curse), and occurs when corrupt regimes choose not to reinvest in infrastructure, 
education, and other public goods, but rather spend their earnings on developing 
patronage networks to preserve power.95 Since the establishment of jamahiriya, Libya’s 
economy has ebbed and flowed, but one constant has remained: central in (or, at a 
minimum, implicit in) every protest is the mismanagement of Libya’s economy and 
resources. Figure 3 shows the major natural resources in Libya and how the population 
densities tend surround those resources.  
94 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 11-15. 
95 Terra Lawson-Remer and Joshua Greenstein, “Beating the Resource Curse in Africa: A Global 
Effort,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 2012, http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/beating-
resource-curse-africa-global-effort/p28780.  
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 Figure 3.  Libya’s Population and Energy Production96 
a. Economics in Action 
A sharp decline in oil revenues, coupled with ideological differences, was the 
precursor to the first coup attempt against Gaddafi in 1975. In 1977, 22 officers involved 
in the attempted coup were purged as Gaddafi withdrew his association with the 
remaining Free Officers Union in exchange for a more exclusive group: the “men of the 
tent.”97 Driven ideologically by common domestic and foreign policies, the men of the 
tent were equally driven to control the flow of money throughout Libya. Their model was 
simple: focus on the short term to “buy off the population” and make the regime the sole 
source of income.98  
96 “Libya’s Population and Energy Production,” China.org.cn., last modified, March 22, 2011, 
http://china.org.cn/world/2011-03/22/content_22197846.htm. 
97 George Joffe, “Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2001 Uprisings,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings 
and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. Jason Pack, (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2013), 24.  
98 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 608. 
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The pursuit of an egalitarian society was, to an extent, successful. Under 
Gaddafi’s socialist paradigm, wealth was shared equally and control of large industries 
and businesses was transferred over to the people’s committees.99 The banking and oil 
industries were nationalized, forcing foreign ventures to hand over their assets or return 
home. The guiding principle was that “only the needy can be exploited, [therefore,] need 
itself should be abolished,” which created the domestic policy of “the abolition of 
need.”100 This policy was egalitarian by design, and “by the late 1970s virtually no 
Libyan wanted for housing, medical care, or transportation.”101 However, Gaddafi would 
discover that his version of utopia was unsustainable.  
By 1984, the entire market became centralized (though nominally under popular 
control) under “a profoundly intolerant, autocratic, and proto-fascist corporate system 
which exercised its hegemony over the economy.”102 As much as the government wanted 
to exert control over business, specifically the oil business, it simply did not have the 
expertise to truly manage the market, but rather, was forced to react to it. Much of the 
Libyan economic elite saw the writing on the wall and left for Europe, which placed 
Libya’s economic policies in the hands of very few capable economists, plus Gaddafi 
himself.  
Sanctions also played a part in Libya’s economic misfortunes. Numerous 
international sanctions were placed on Libya, which resulted in consequences ranging 
from political isolation to dips in oil prices and the valuation of currency. As yet another 
short-term response, the government offered subsides and housing to appease popular 
grievances. Despite this sop, opponents of the regime still emerged, typically from the 
east (Cyrenaica), which led the jamahiriya to passively target the east by ensuring it 
remained underdeveloped.103  
99 Popular Protest,” ICG, 8. 
100 Lisa Anderson, “Qadhafi’s Legacy: An Evaluation of a Political Experiment,” in Qadhafi’s Libya: 
1969 to 1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 225-226.  
101 Ibid. 
102 Joffe, “Civil Activism,” 24-25. 
103 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 617. 
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b. Sanctions 
Almost immediately after the September 1st revolution, Gaddafi began his 
ideological vendetta against the West. By kicking out the British, Americans, and French 
from their military bases in Libya, nationalizing foreign oil exploration and refinement 
assets, and allying with the Soviet Union, Gaddafi made his stance against the West clear 
and himself a target of diplomatic pressure—in particular, sanctions.  
Performed properly, sanctions can cause belligerents to change their ways. This is 
precisely what happened in Libya after 1979, when the United States imposed unilateral 
sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are typically unsuccessful; however, these coincided with 
a Libyan recession, due to a fall in oil prices and oil demand, as well as a poor attempt to 
nationalize the oil industry; the United States exacerbated these problems by prohibiting 
the import of Libyan oil and the export of oil-refinement machinery and eventually 
removing U.S. oil companies from Libya.104 An UN-levied sanction in 1992 caused even 
more economic fallout, and as a result “virtually every Libyan family found itself 
involved in the black market” and the Libyan government was cornered into making 
concessions.105  
Gaddafi’s domestic economic policy relied heavily on subsidies for nearly every 
public good, from social services to medical care. Not only were public goods subsidized, 
but so too were everyday commodities such as food, oil, and fuel. This meant that the 
average Libyan could get these products for a significantly lower price than their 
counterparts could obtain in a neighboring country, encouraging black-market sales. The 
combination of a population involved in black-market trading, coupled with subsidies for 
high-demand goods still guaranteed “that Libya’s porous borders remain[ed] a contested 
site for competing smuggling networks.”106 
The successful implementation of sanctions, particularly the UN sanctions, played 
a significant role in the outcome of two major international standoffs between Libya and 
104 Ronald Bruce St. John, “The Post-Qadhafi Economy,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the 
Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. Jason Pack, (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 88. 
105 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 609. 
106 St. John, “The Post-Qadhafi Economy,” 94-95. 
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the West. The first was in reference to the extradition of suspected terrorists responsible 
for the Lockerbie bombing. The second resulted in an agreement on non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The colonel was caught in a lose–lose situation. He could not extradite 
the Lockerbie suspects because they were from major tribes, which would have 
threatened his power base; but “simultaneously, the socioeconomic and political malaise 
in the country empowered the Islamist opposition movement which called for a jihad 
against Qaddafi’s regime.”107 The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was gaining 
momentum in the 1990s, and perhaps Gaddafi saw this as the greater of two evils. This 
would explain his eventual cooperation with the West in regard to the extradition of the 
terror suspects. In Gaddafi’s later years, he became desperate to rebuild his economy, 
even if it meant working with the West. This led him to give up his nuclear-arms program 
in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Perhaps the biggest effect of these sanctions was 
that Gaddafi had to begin seeking international recognition.108  
c. Revenue Sources 
One of Libya’s main sources of revenue is its oil. Libya ranks in the top ten 
countries in the world for proven oil reserves. Of note, 80 percent of its reserves are 
located in Sirte. In the late 1960s, Libyan oil production peaked at approximately three 
million barrels a day. That number suffered significantly in the 1980s and 1990s as a 
result of sanctions and the exodus of oil expertise and business elites. With the turn of the 
century and better international relations, oil production began to rise again. Similarly, 
Libya’s natural gas exports (ranked in the top five in Africa) have declined in recent 
years.109  
Given the oil reserves in Libya and “a population of a mere six million, many 
Libyans believe their country ought to resemble Dubai.”110 The difference between other 
Gulf states and Libya is that Libya did not have an oil boom per se. Gaddafi wanted to 
107 Ronen, “Britain’s Return to Libya,” 684. 
108 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution’,” 121. 
109 “Country Analysis Brief: Libya,” US Energy Information Administration, last modified, November 
25, 2014, 2-9. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ly. 
110 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 2. 
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shield the population and institutions from the impacts of oil. He therefore provided the 
citizenry with the public goods they needed at no cost or subsidized cost. Furthermore, he 
fought modernization from external influences, specifically ‘“disruptive’ foreign 
technological and societal influences from impinging on the traditional framework of 
Libyan society.”111  
Most of the industry created centered on support systems for petroleum and 
natural-gas exploration; however, in the early 1980s, Libya expanded into other 
industries, generally based on geography. For example, Misrata became the center of the 
steel industry; Wadi Shatti (southern Tripolitania) focused on its iron deposits; Abu 
Kammash (near Tunisia) developed a chemical-fertilizer industry; and Ras al-Unuf 
(located at the end of the Sirte pipelines) manufactured petrochemicals. By 1985 these 
cities “would act as regional centers for future industrial development.”112  
Libya has always struggled in the agricultural sector. About 20 percent of the 
population was farmers. Water was scarce, and the government imported about 50 
percent of the food. The limited fertile soil was at risk because salt water was beginning 
to contaminate freshwater coastal aquifers. Gaddafi had either to settle the farmers closer 
to freshwater sources buried deep underground in the desert or develop an elaborate 
pipeline to bring fresh water to the farmers. Gaddafi initially tried the former, but 
eventually put his faith in the latter, and in 1983 Libya officially began the “great man-
made river project.” The project came at a time of economic peril for Libya and the 
actual execution of the construction was contrary to Gaddafi’s economic philosophy. It 
was completely run by foreign consultants and technology and required every Libyan to 
pay the equivalent of two months’ salary.113  
The project was a tremendous endeavor; at times Gaddafi referred to it as the 
eighth wonder of the world. Despite receiving criticism by skeptics it had positive 
111 Youssef Mohammed Sawani, “Dynamics of Continuity and Change,” in The 2011 Libyan 
Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, ed. Jason Pack, (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 62. 
112 Dirk Vandewalle, “The Libyan Jamahiriyya Since 1969,” in Qadhafi’s Libya: 1969 to 1994, ed 
Dirk Vandewalle, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 29. 
113 Ibid., 29-31. 
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impacts. By mid-2000, the government had completed phases one to three of the project 
(see Figure 4). This meant that the fresh water from the deserts was now transported to 
Benghazi (phase one) and to Tripoli (phase two) and a pipeline connected the two cities 
(phase three). Libyan workers slowly, but surely, replaced foreign contractors as they 
gained expertise. Jobs in manufacturing pipelines became available and, most 
importantly, the populated areas of Libya now received abundant fresh water. Gaddafi 
envisioned the project as a model that other African nations could emulate to boost their 
economies, attract investment, and provide water to needy populations.114  
114John Watkins, “Libya’s Thirst for ‘Fossil Water,’” BBC News, March 18, 2006, 
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 Figure 4.  Libya’s Great Man-Made River Project115 
3. Social Front 
The philosophy of Jamahiriya impacted the day to day interaction of the Libyan 
people. Familial and tribal groups were given a level of autonomy to govern themselves, 
and through a system of patronage, provided their allegiance back to Gaddafi. Certain 
segments of society were ostracized, like the Islamists, and were either repressed into 
submission or forced to operate in secret. The following sections will focus on 
highlighting the impact Gaddafi had on certain segments of society as well as the 
domestic impacts on civil society.    
115 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Great Man-Made River (GMR),” accessed February 3, 2015, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/243446/Great-Man-Made-River-GMR. 
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a. Libyan Tribes 
Libya has been a very tribally based country since well before independence. The 
three main ethnicities (Arab/Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou) can be easily seen in Figure 5, 
and hundreds of subtribes and clans exist under the three main ethnicities. When hit with 
times of economic hardship “Libyans simply withdrew to these familial and tribal 
institutions,” and COL Gaddafi made a point in the second volume of the Green Book 
that loyalties are strongest and should be encouraged at the family, clan, and tribal level 
and that the loyalty slowly dissipates as they reach regional and state levels.116 These 
communities are what provided society with protection, rule of law, and other public 
goods that would typically be provided by the state. Conservative estimates suggest that 
over 140 tribes and clans exist in Libya, however, according Dr. Faraj Abdulaziz Najm 
(Libyan Social Scientist and Historian) no more than 30 tribes and clans have influence 
on decision making in the country.117  
 
116 Vandewalle, “Libyan Jamahiriyya Since 1969,” 34. 
117 Abdulsattar Hatitah and Asharq Al-Awsat, “Libyan Tribal Map: Network of Loyalties that will 
Determine Gaddafi’s Fate,” CETRI, last modified  February 24, 2011, 
http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article2102&lang=en.   
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 Figure 5.  Libyan Tribes118 
It is important to remember that tribal affiliation in Libya does not equate to 
absolute loyalty. For example, it was not uncommon to see members of the pro-Gaddafi 
Magariha tribe protesting alongside Gaddafi’s opposition. This might occur for a number 
of reasons, such as a direct result of the policies Gaddafi implemented—some tribes, for 
example, have members who have urbanized and are therefore less reliant on the tribal 
structure for public goods and daily survival, and others may weigh religious loyalties as 
greater than those of the tribe.119  
118 “Understanding Libya: The Role of Ethnic and Tribal Groups in any Political Settlement,” Fragile 




                                                 
Of the three ethnicities, the Arab and Berbers are largest in population. Prominent 
tribes, from east to west, are the Zintan Warfallah, Bani Walid, and Misrata (see Figure 
5). Located further south, near the town of Sabha, are the pro-Gaddafi tribes of Magariha 
and Gaddafi. Colonel Gaddafi co-opted three main tribes: “his own (the Gaddafi) and the 
allied Maqariha (whom he married into) and Warfalla (the country’s largest),” to whom 
Gaddafi granted prominent positions in the military, policy and intelligence services.120 
By no means is Figure 5 an all-inclusive list of significant tribes, but rather, an attempt to 
highlight the tribes and areas that played an important role in the recent history of Libya 
and a significant role in the 17 February revolution and its aftermath.  
The Toubou and the Tuareg are minorities who inhabit the sparsely populated and 
vast southern regions of Libya. The Tuareg population spans several North African 
states: generally the border regions of Libya, Niger, Algeria, and Mali. The Toubou, on 
the other hand, are concentrated in Libya, Chad, and Niger. Their relationship with 
Gaddafi was similar in the sense that both tribes were disenfranchised politically and 
socioeconomically and were tools for foreign policy. For example, Gaddafi made claim 
to resources in northern Chad by virtue of the Toubou population’s integrated status 
within Libya. He was also a supporter of the Toubou separatist movement in Chad, the 
National Liberation Front. The Tuareg were hired by Gaddafi as security forces, but more 
importantly he used his relationship to posture himself as a regional power by arbitrating 
disputes between the Tuaregs, Niger, and Mali. Unofficially, the Toubou and Tuareg 
profited greatly from the black market. Their transnational affiliations allow them to 
move easily any subsidized goods, such as food and oil, or illicit goods, such as weapons 
and narcotics, with relative ease.121 
Despite the powerful influence of the tribes, Gaddafi was able to implement 
strong policies that had substantial effects in civil society and religion. Although not all 
his policies were negative, many had less-than-positive consequences, and they were 
created for the primary purpose of keeping the population in line and Gaddafi in power. 
120 “Understanding Libya,” Fragile States. 
121 Henry Smith, “The South,” The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi 
Future, ed. Jason Pack, (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 179-185. 
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b. Civil Society and Religion 
Civil society in Libya under Gaddafi was progressive as compared to other Arab 
nations, particularly for women. For example, women in Libya have been afforded many 
liberties and have held prominent positions, such as judges, since 1975. Personal-status 
laws were also favorable towards women, who had the right to divorce and approval 
authority in polygamy. Women played a crucial role in mobilizing and leading the initial 
protests of the 17 February revolution.122  
Education also grew by leaps and bounds during the 40-plus years of Gaddafi’s 
tenure. This can be attributed partly to urbanization and partly to policy. In 1975, Libya 
had only two universities, but by 2004, that number had grown to nine, with an additional 
84 vocational-training centers. Students studying abroad in Western universities found 
themselves victims of political tempests— particularly in the mid-1980s—but by the time 
diplomatic relations were restored in the 2000s, Libyan students were again studying in 
Western universities, in numbers circling 10,000. These educated elites provided the 
professional forces for Libya; but having been exposed to other political possibilities that 
existed throughout the world, they would return to create another segment of the 
population willing to protest the regime.123  
The hardship in Libya that came from Gaddafi’s isolationist policies and Western 
sanctions had ripple effects throughout society. By 1987, “consumer shortages and bread 
lines had become common features in most Libyan cities,” forcing families to hold 
multiple jobs.124 Because families had to work harder, performance slipped as work was 
not being accomplished properly. Schools saw a noticeable drop in student quality and 
hospitals lacked maintenance.125  
Shortly after establishing the SPLAJ, Gaddafi took over the media, but he did not 
stop there. He started a policy of collective punishment when tribes fell out of line, and 
122 Langhi, “Gender and State-Building,” 201.  
123 Joffe, “Civil Activism,” 32-33. 
124 Vandewalle, “Libyan Jamahiriyya Since 1969,” 33. 
125 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution’,” 122. 
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often had to resort to using force. He showed how disconnected from the people he was 
in 1999, when he made himself the ‘“African King of Kings’, [and] championed Pan-
Africanism and African Unity” while Libyans were rioting against black-African 
immigrants in Libya.126 Black Africans found themselves the “victims of episodes of 
racism and xenophobia in Libya,” and this lead to the African Awakening and the 
massacres of 2000,127 which serve as strong indicators of the civil frustrations growing in 
Libya.  
Gaddafi was known to be heavy handed towards Islamists. His reforms to the 
Islamic courts prompted the growth of an Islamist challenge to his authority. The Ikhwan 
sought a “pan-Islamic as opposed to –Arab[,]… sharia-based as opposed to socialist, 
divinely sanctioned as opposed to populist” rule over Libya.128 The group was 
successfully repressed, and from that point forward, every Islamist group was referred to 
as Ikhwan. Gaddafi was ruthless when targeting Islamists and even held public and 
televised hangings. Repression in the 1980s and 1990s served as a prequel to the 
establishment of the LIFG. Gaddafi captured the essence of his repression with this 
appeal to the Libyan citizens: “If you know anyone who is one of those heretics 
[Islamists] then he should be killed and liquidated just like a dog. Without trial. Do not be 
afraid. Nobody will arrest you or put you on trial if you kill a heretic.”129 Gaddafi simply 
perpetuated a system of repression against Islamists, impunity for the use of informal 




126 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 608-610. 
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D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Before independence, Libya served a geopolitical purpose under Italian and 
British rule. Oil had not yet been discovered, so the revenue brought in by foreign 
occupation was, to a small extent, needed. The Italians made two decisions of 
significance with regard to rule of law: first, to have a mixed judicial system whereby 
rural areas were adjudicated according to tribal or Islamic courts and urban areas had 
state-run tribunals supplemented by sharia courts for civil matters. The dual-court system 
worked fairly well and was resistant to corruption. The second decision by the Italians 
had negative consequences for the development of Libya—namely, the establishment of 
STDS tribunals to repress and intimidate potential subversive activity. Throughout 
Libya’s evolution, the dual-court system and the courts used as instruments for repression 
were regularity revisited.  
The brief period of British control opened the doors for Western involvement and 
investment in Libya. Between France, the United States,, and the UK, the main interest 
was ensuring that staging bases in Libya were sufficient to repel or deter Soviet 
aggression. Once Libya gained its independence, in December 1951, King Idris made a 
pact allowing Western forces to stay in Libya. The king attempted to turn the judiciary 
into a single state-court system, but under heavy protest, reverted back to the dual 
system—yet another instance of the people demanding a semblance of Islamic law in 
daily life. Both the height and the downfall of Idris’s reign can be marked by the first 
shipment of oil on October 1961. A slow increase in economic pseudo-independence, 
coupled with pan-Arabic nationalism, gave voice to Islamists and revolutionaries and 
eventually forced the king to sever relations with the West.  
Riding the waves of pan-Arabism, economic prosperity, and independence from 
foreign influence, the Free Unionist Movement seized control of Libya in a bloodless 
coup on 01 September 1969. The years between the coup and 1977, when Gaddafi 
officially established the jamahiriya, constitute his formative years. He wrote two of his 
three green-book volumes, combined the dual court system, removing the religious 
interpretation aspect of sharia, created a special court designed for repression, removed 
Western influence, and nationalized foreign assets, particularly in the oil industry. His 
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actions against the West and alliance with the Soviet Union would set him on a path of 
regular contention with the West.  
Gaddafi’s vision of institutional development employed two opposing forces. On 
one hand, he wanted to transform “Libya into a bastion for his regional ambitions” of 
pan-Arabism, and on the other, “Qadhafi’s concerns for security and dominance” 
prevented the establishment of any institutions with true power, authority, or 
influence.130 This weakened political/military, economic, and social institutions. His 
policy of abolition of need, which worked during good times, meant that when economic 
hardship struck, the entire country suffered. By 1985, Libya had a very contentious 
relationship with the United States and UK, and by 1992, was placed under sanctions by 
the UN. The relationships remained tense until 2005, with the normalization of relations 
following Gaddafi’s 2002 announcement that he would to cease production of weapons 
of mass destruction.  
Gaddafi’s children owned the telecommunications, construction, maritime 
transport (they had been granted control of the oil and natural gas trade), and a diverse 
conglomerate called the One Nine Group showing the depth of nepotism that existed 
within the Gaddafi family, and causing Libyans to work “outside of the official 
framework in order to get anything done.”131 At the same time, Saif Al-Islam (one of 
Gaddafi’s children) worked closely with reform-minded Libyans, perhaps out of genuine 
concern, but turned hawkish and anti-reform when the February 17, 2011 revolution 
began fomenting.132 The people did not have a voice in the Gaddafi family.  
The revolution started on January 28, 2011, when, in reaction to the Tunisian 
revolution and domestic unrest, Gaddafi told Libyan youth “to take what was rightfully 
theirs”—which youth took as an invitation to occupy housing projects across the 
country.133 Next, on the heels of the Egyptian revolution, Libyans living abroad primed a 
130 Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, “Institutional Development in Qadhafi’s Libya,” in 
Qadhafi’s Libya: 1969 to 1994, ed Dirk Vandewalle, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 175. 
131 Alison Pargeter, “Libya: Reforming the Impossible?” Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 
108 (2007): 232. 
132 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 4. 
133 Ibid, 2. 
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revolutionary fervor through online postings on February14. On February15, Fathi Terbil 
(a human-rights lawyer) was arrested in Benghazi. A February 17 protest on the 
anniversary of the Danish cartoons of Mohammed in 2006 turned into clashes between 
protesters and security forces, resulting in ten demonstrators killed. The arrest of Terbil 
had little to do with the protests or Egypt, but symbolically it made no difference. The 
government had expected unrest in Tripoli or Bani Walid, not in Benghazi. The 








134 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 2-3. 
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III. A CONTEMPORARY STUDY 
On the heels of Tunisian and Egyptian unrest, it is not difficult to imagine 
Gaddafi’s fear of possible revolution—never mind his natural state of hypersensitivity to 
any form of discontent. What started as an annual protest against a Danish cartoon 
quickly snowballed into revolution. The emotions of 40-plus years of repression came to 
the foreground, and nothing could be done to slow it down.  
1. Political 
In reaction to the initial days of protest, Gaddafi’s security forces defaulted to the 
strategy of repression. As Libyan diplomat Ahmed Jibril recalls, on the first day of 
protests in Al Bayda (between Dernah and Benghazi) 300 people showed up, two were 
killed, and 5,000 attended the funeral; when 15 people were killed, 50,000 people showed 
up; “the more Qaddafi kills people, the more people go into the street.”135 Gaddafi’s 
policies left him with no other option than to repress. His ideology contended that power 
belonged the people, and he held no formal position in government, so they were 
absurdly assumed to be protesting against themselves; it was also practical to repress 
dissent, because institutional change occurred slowly, which left no room for quick 
reform.136 
Demonstrators in Tripoli and Benghazi protested ‘“deteriorating economic 
conditions and the limited job opportunities for recent graduates as well as the attacks on 
religious leaders and intuitions.’”137 In Tripoli, protestors symbolically burned the 
congress building as a display of how much they thought the People’s Congress 
represented the population. Gaddafi resorted again to tactics he used against LIFG in the 
1990s. He called the protestors “cockroaches,” suggested they were drugged by AQ, and 
135 “Popular Protest,” ICG, 5. 
136 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 610-611. 
137 Ibid., 615. 
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as he had before, told his followers to don green armbands and seek and destroy the 
rebels.138  
The National Transitional Council (NTC) was established only ten days after the 
revolution began and served as a rallying center for the revolutionaries. The NTC 
“included 31 representatives from Libya’s towns and cities and was said to operate by 
consensus…The council’s leadership was composed largely of a combination of former 
political prisoners, reformists technocrats and regime officials who had defected to the 
rebels.”139 Unfortunately, four decades of jamahiriya political culture was ingrained in 
the new leaders’ psyche—the new interim government suffered the same problems of 
weak parties, committees of the masses, and lack of hierarchy in decision making.140 
With increased rebel success, Gaddafi intensified his attacks on the population. 
As a result, the UN passed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, establishing a 
no-fly zone over Libya, and NATO initiated assistance on the ground to the rebel 
forces.141 As the fighting began to culminate in September and October of 2011, the NTC 
unearthed several mass graves in Tripoli, confirming Gaddafi’s role in targeting the 
population. In October, Gaddafi was killed, ending an eight-month revolution. The NTC 
vowed to hold elections eight months after the end of fighting, and in August 2012, the 
General National Congress (GNC) took control of the government.142  
The two main parties in the GNC were the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) Justice 
and Construction Party (JCP) and the secular National Forces Alliance (NFA); however, 
the people remained skeptical of political parties, with just over a quarter of the 
population claiming trust. As a result, the first election had 120 members elected as 
individuals and only 80 members by party affiliation.143 With general distrust and lack of 
unity, the GNC found itself in endless debate and indecisiveness.  
138 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 616. 
139 Ibid., 617. 
140 Gaub, “A Libyan Recipe for Disaster,” 102.  
141 Capasso, “Understanding Libya’s ‘Revolution,’” 116. 
142 “Middle East Journal,” Project MUSE 66, no. 1 (2012): 143-144. 
143 Gaub, “A Libyan Recipe for Disaster,” 103. 
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The military also became a point of contention. Under the NTC, the Libyan armed 
forces fell under the Supreme Security Committee (SSC) (subordinate to the ministry of 
the interior), which failed to address any systemic problems with the military, i.e., 
unprofessionalism, poorly leadership, and bad equipment. Instead, the SSC and GNC 
competed for control of the armed forces, and when that did not work, the SSC tried to 
recruit regional and tribal militias of varying degrees of capability.144 Some of the main 
militias were Libya Shield (aligned with and composed of the Libyan armed forces and 
generally Western militias), Libya Dawn (aligned with the JCP and Islamists), Zintan 
Militia (aligned with the NFA), and Misrata Militia (aligned with the JCP).  
2. Social Costs 
The first and most devastating impact to a population is the tremendous cost of 
civil war in terms of life. According to Jane’s defense and security database, over 1,800 
Libyans have been killed and over 3,000 wounded in fighting since the first free election 
in August 2012.145 Militias have been a source of great strife, but at the same time, they 
provide some semblance of governance, primarily because of their regional ties. For 
example, the Abu Salim Martyr Brigade is often reported as providing public goods to 
the population, which helps explain why they are in violent opposition to Islamic Shura 
Youth Council (MSSI)—because MSSI competes for influence in the daily life of their 
hometown.  
Trust is at the root of the problems seen between militias and politics. In the 
House of Representatives (HoR), following the 2014 elections, the JCP feared they would 
be purged by the NFA and positions such as the grand mufti would be dissolved, along 
with Islamist brigades—though the real anxiety lay with the uncertainty of Hiftar’s 
intentions.146 The launch of Operation Dignity and the counteroffensive by Libya Dawn 
exemplifies this distrust, which has manifested itself in indiscriminate attacks, human-
144 Gaub, “A Libyan Recipe for Disaster,” 107-108. 
145 “Terrorism and Insurgency Centre,” IHS Jane’s Filters, 
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146 Alison Pargeter, “Libya: The Politics of Revenge,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, August 26, 2014, 
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rights abuses, and violations of international humanitarian law. As of October 2014, the 
office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 
287,000 IDPs who have attempted to flee these abuses.147 Islamists were the targets of 
repression during the Gaddafi era and now, with the return of General Hiftar, the 
targeting of Islamists is seen as a continuation of that repression. Likewise, just as 
Gaddafi’s repression of Islamists drove them underground and fostered a more radical 
outlook, e.g. LIFG, so too are current moderate Islamists driven to align with more 
radical groups to strengthen their chances of survival.148  
3. Judicial and Legal Issues 
Very little attention was paid by the transitional government and the elected 
government to the transition of rule of law and a judiciary strategy. Many viewed the 
judicial system as still sympathetic to the old regime and as such, incapable of trying 
Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam.149 However, there were structural changes made to the 
judiciary. The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was altered to make it more independent 
from government, there was a ban placed on all special tribunals, and the SJC made a 
commitment to human rights.150 
Post-revolutionary judicial action became questionable. Trials for former regime 
officials were seen as corrupt, even though the government vetted the adjudicated judges 
internally, and perception became reality. The mufti of Tripoli even came forward and 
proclaimed that the judiciary had three purposes: 1) to eliminate statutes in conflict with 
Islamic law, 2) to eliminate laws regarding unfair regulation, and 3) to purge corrupt 
judges.151 
In October 2012, the SJC presented the GNC with a proposal to purge every judge 
and retain only those who could show active participation in and support of the 17 
147 “Libya: Rule of the Gun: Abductions, Torture and other Militia Abuses in Western Libya,” 
Amnesty International, (London, United Kingdom: Amnesty International, 2014), 5-6. 
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February revolution. These remaining judges would form a secret committee to screen 
and hire new judges. The difficulty with this plan was twofold. First, in a time of public 
skepticism, it is impossible to maintain transparency and also establish a secret 
committee, and second, the effectiveness of a purge without due process is questionable 
at best.152 
Distancing oneself from anything related to the Gaddafi regime seemed to be the 
common course of action for members of the transitional government. The legislature 
passed a political-isolation law that placed a “ten-year ban from office for anyone who is 
associated with the former regime or ‘took a position against the 17 February 
revolution.’”153 The law passed in May 2013 and resulted in a loss of incumbent 
expertise, and almost two years later, in February 2015, the GNC repealed the law. In the 
two-year period, senior officials were forced to step down, including those who 
commanded units in the armed forces. Highly reminiscent of the “de-Ba’athification” in 
Iraq, the struggling Libyan military was delivered a final coup de grâce, further 
solidifying the government’s reliance on militias.154  
A final piece of questionable legislation was also passed early in the revolution 
but later repealed. Known as Law 37, this legislation “prohibited criticism of the 
revolution, the state, Libyan institutions and Islam, as well as ‘propaganda.’”155 The law 
was essentially a carryover from a piece of Gaddafi legislation and brought into question 
the revolution’s commitment to freedoms and rights for the people.  
As was the case with Jamahiriya, judges remain untrained, with estimates 
suggesting that “roughly 30–40 percent of judges did not go through formal legal 
training.”156 These new courts looked eerily like the old Gaddafi courts, but now were 
continually undermined by militias, which are generally held in high esteem by the 
152 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 21. 
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population. This created a culture of impunity that glorified criminals as heroes and 
allowed abuses, torture, and illegal detentions to continue without recrimination.157 
4. Economic 
Control over resources became a goal for all parties involved. Raids on military 
camps and depots to obtain small, medium, and heavy weapons—from rifles to surface-
to-air missiles —were common, and without a professional military to stand in the way, 
the weapons were ripe for the taking. Foreign investors also were caught in the crossfire, 
such as “a Chinese construction company in Ajdabiya that had been taken over by Ansar 
al-Shari’a” and was consequently bombed by General Hiftar’s forces.158 But it was 
control over oil that most devastated the ability to sustain government.  
Hydrocarbon production had been decreased nearly 100 percent by the end of 
2011, the only production that occurred was for domestic consumption. The International 
Energy Agency had to coordinate a draw of 60 million barrels of emergency oil reserves 
to cover the loss from Libya, the first time since the 2005 response to Hurricane Katrina. 
Production was further hampered by a blockade of eastern port facilities in late 2013 that 
remained in effect until April 2014. Oil and gas exports accounted for 96 percent of the 
country’s revenue. With the exception of 2012, when the oil industry rebounded slightly, 
each year production declined to the point in 2014 when Libya earned $4 billion in six 
months, whereas before the conflict it was earning $4 billion monthly. Figure 6 shows a 
chart of the ebb and flow of oil production as a result of the revolution.159 
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 Figure 6.  Crude Oil Production in Libya, January 2010 to November 2014160 
160 “Country Analysis Brief: Libya,” US Energy Information Administration, 7. 
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The remainder of this chapter broadly outlines the various militias and 
organizations operating in Libya. The number of militias varies greatly, but is typically 
generalized as hundreds. The purpose of the following sections is not to provide an 
exhaustive list, but rather a description of the militias and organizations sufficient to raise 
one specific question: how do these groups contribute to the stability or instability of 
Libya and the region? This question forms the basis of the next chapter as the groups are 
categorized as either political or Islamist and their sub-categorizes are defined.  
B. POLTICAL FORCES 
The current political system has gone through significant changes since the 
revolution. At first there was the NTC, which established initial governance, but more 
importantly, enabled elections. In August 2012, elections were held and the GNC was 
formed. The MB and other Islamist parties did not do as well as they had hoped. The MB, 
through its political party, the JCP, developed political alliances to challenge the NFA. 
The political competition continued to manifest itself outside politics and tension rose to 
the point where Islamist parties separated from government and formed their own shadow 
government. The people called for new elections in 2014, and in June, 200 members were 
elected to the House of Representatives (HoR), which was no longer called the GNC. As 
of early 2015, the officially recognized government, the HoR, is located in the east of the 
city Tobruk and lead by PM Abdullah al-Thinni. It is backed by General Khalifa Hiftar 
and the Zintan militia. The rival Islamist government, the new GNC, is located in Tripoli 
and lead by PM Omar al Hassi. They are backed by Libya Dawn and a series of other 
Islamist militias. 
Adding to the internal political dynamics are regional actors with a vested interest 
in supporting either the HoR or GNC. These external dynamics manifest themselves in a 
number of ways. For example, Egypt launched a series of air strikes into Libya against 
ISIS targets following the kidnapping and beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. 
Other countries have taken sides between the secular political parties and the MB. 
Foreign involvement has exacerbated the chaos and turned the Libyan civil war into a 
proxy war, with Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan siding with the MB and Islamists, and the 
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United Arab Emirates and Egypt supporting Hiftar and the nationalists.161 With the 
expansion of ISIS into the area, it is likely that these proxy battles will become more 
overt. 
1. Government Forces 
Table 1 is a list of active government forces, but the table excludes militias that 
were co-opted to maintain security post revolution. The militias that were co-opted, even 
if they receive a salary from the government, are categorized as regional militias. The 
separation was done to distinguish between the formal security forces of Libya and the 
informal security forces. Some formal security organizations, like Libya Shield, do serve 
as umbrella organizations which hold regional militias as members. This is explained in 
the text of the tables, but helps to highlight why security reform in Libya is difficult. 
 
 
161 Andrew Engel, “PolicyWatch 2295: Libya’s Other Battle,” The Washington Institute, last modified 
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Table 1.   Government Forces 
Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
Libyan Armed 
Forces162 
The four LAF branches are the army, navy, 
air force, and air defense, carried over from 
the Gaddafi regime and initially affected by 
the political-isolation law, which has recently 






Ministry of Defense: 
Brigadier Gen. Mas’ud 
Arumah; Army: Major 
General Abdulsalam al-
Obaid; Navy: 
Commodore Hassan Ali 











The largest pro-HoR umbrella organization 
in Libya. Originally activated by the NTC 
due to lack of a capable armed force and to 
consolidate rebel forces. Comprises four 
brigades across Libya, consisting of many 
smaller regional militias and organizations 
with diverse allegiances and goals. Competes 
for power with rival umbrella organization, 







control of rebel 
militias  
Wissam Ben Hamid  Numerous 
162 “Libya Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, last modified October 27, 2014, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?ItemId=1303736.  
163 “Guide to Key Libyan Militias,” BBC, May 20, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19744533. 
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Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
General Hiftar 
Forces164 
General Hiftar defected from the Gaddafi 
regime in the late 1980s, and returned to 
Libya to aid the revolution in 2014. He 
garnered support from security forces 
opposed to Islamists, particularly Ansar al 
Sharia in Libya (AAL). His forces are 
approximately 6,000 strong and often 
referred to as the Libyan National Army 
(LNA), but in reality, he controls only a 
portion of the official army. He is best 
known for Operation Dignity, the targeting 
of Islamist organizations in eastern Libya 








intelligence unit  
National Security 
Directorate165 
Libya’s police force, responsible for general 








These two units are responsible for 
investigations, with a focus on counter-
narcotics. The anti-crime unit is accused of 
complicity in the kidnapping of former prime 






Established in 2012 to protect Libya’s oil, 
they have been known to prevent oil 
shipments if they sense corruption in the 







164 “Non-State Armed Groups, Libya,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – North Africa, last modified October 29, 2014, 5.  




                                                 
2. Regional Militia 
Table 2 accounts for a number of regional militias that were created following the 
17 February revolution. Some regional militias formed alliances with the government or 
Islamist groups—the alliance is annotated in the text of the table whenever multiple 
alliances exist. The reliance of the government on regional militias for security is one of 
necessity, but has the consequence putting informal power at odds with formal power. 
The following regional militia are deeply entrenched in fighting one another, Islamist 
forces, and governmental forces for power and control over territory, politics, and 




Table 2.   Regional Militias 





In control of some of the most powerful 
militias in Tripoli and aligned with the 
Warfallah tribe; second largest in the country 
next to Misrata. Though a regional militia, 
supported and funded by the Libyan 
government. Its main rival is the Misrata 
militia. Includes members from 23 Zintan 
and Nafusa Mountain militias, and is best 
known for capturing Saif al-Islam Gaddafi 
(son of Gaddafi) and defending Tripoli 















Started as regional revolutionary militias; 
under PM Zidan, felt marginalized and took 
a closer stance with the JCP. Has been 
reported at 40,000 members deployed 
throughout Libya. Aligned with the 
Mashasha tribe and rivalries with the Zintan 
militia.  
Promote 





Ali Mousa (leader of 





168 “Non-State Armed Groups,” Jane’s, 1-2. 
169 Ibid, 3-4. 
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LROR was established to provide security in 
the capital Tripoli and are ideologically 
aligned with the MB’s JCP. Responsible for 
the kidnapping of former-prime-minister Ali 
Zidan. Subsequently deactivated, then 













Aligned with the Zintan militia and tasked 
with unconventional missions: protection of 
government officials, border security, and 
law and order in Tripoli. Al-Qaaqaa BDE 
was with the defense of Tripoli airport in 
mid-2014. Strength is approximately 18,000 
fighters; the most professional and well 










Primarily Zintanis living in Tripoli who 











170 Jon Mitchell, “War in Libya and its Futures: State of Play – Islamist & Misrata Forces (1),” Red Team Analysis Society, last modified January 5, 2015, 
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Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
Army of 
Cyrenaica173 
Military arm of Cyrenaica, which has 
avoided conflict with the Libyan 
government. Seeks autonomy from the 
government in the form of federalism—not a 
separatist movement. A semblance of 
autonomy is key. Leaders are from military 
ranks and King Idris relatives. 
Autonomy of the 





nephew of King Idris) 
Leader: Hamid Hassi 
head of political bureau 










Works closely with the army of Cyrenaica. 
Best known for disruption of Libyan 
economy through control of oil facilities in 
Ras Lanuf, Zueitina, and Sidra, to make a 
statement about economic inequalities. Their 
forces’ size is assessed at more than 3,000; 








Colonel Najeeb al-Hassi 
Head of Political Bureau 












Composed of former revolutionaries from 
Zintan. The Tripoli Revolutionary Council is 
not associated with the Zintani militia. They 
are thought to exist to counter influence from 
the Tripoli Military Council (Islamist).  
To bring civil 
order in Tripoli; 
likely, to counter 
Tripoli Military 
Council  
Abdullah Naker  
Tripoli Military 
Council176 
Comprises former LIFG members and holds 
financial and political ties to Qatar. Roughly 
2,000 members at odds with the Tripoli 
Revolutionaries Council. Willing to support 






Abd al-Hakim Belhajj 




173 Ibid., 4. 
174 Ibid., 4-5. 
175 Ibid., 3. 
176 Ibid. 
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C. ISLAMIST FORCES 
Islamist forces generally fall into two categories: nationalist and jihadist. The 
Islamist nationalists, sometimes referred to as political Islamism or Salafi nationalism, 
“adopts contemporary…models of organization – the political party…to focus their 
energies on winning political power…[and] modify their agendas and discourses 
accordingly” to execute Islamic political reform from within the government.177 This 
method of bringing change to the community from within the existing government 
typically implies a long-term approach to Islamism, meaning that most changes will be 
incremental rather than large, sweeping reform, simply by virtue of the slow process of 
politics. In addition to slow change, a risk to following the nationalist route is that if the 
Islamist party loses an election, it signals the end of the movement, and this can be 
unpalatable to the party. This is precisely what happened to the JCP as they were forced 
to form alliances with sympathetic parties to bolster their standing within the NTC and 
GNC, which ultimately led to the shadow/parallel new GNC government’s being 
established in Tripoli in late 2014.  
Islamist jihadists, sometimes referred to as Salafi jihadists, argue that a Western 
form of governance and Islam are incompatible and the only way to achieve change is 
through violence. The distinction between an Islamist jihadist and defensive form of 
jihad, e.g., protection from foreign rule, “arises primarily out of a radical doctrine 
expressing a definite preference for violent over non-violent strategies” of reform—a 
complete overhaul of government through violent means.178 In the case of Libya, 
Gaddafi, circa 1995, actively repelled LIFG attempts at political and institutional change; 
however, the contemporary operating environment and four years of civil war have 
caused Islamist groups to take more aggressive stances towards change. Many moderate 
Islamists who would have fallen in the nationalist school have formed alliances with the 
177 “Understanding Islamism,” International Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report Number 
37, March 2, 2005, 6. 
178 Ibid., 14. 
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more violent forms of Islamism. Even more troubling is that some groups have affiliated 
themselves with ISIS and the pursuit of a global caliphate.  
The umbrella organizations of Libya Dawn and Libya Shield can be problematic 
due to their size. As a rule of thumb, the Libya Dawn forces are supportive of the JCP 
and the new GNC, whereas Libya Shield supports the recognized government HoR. 
However, some members of Libya Shield are also members of subordinate umbrella 
organizations that support Libya Dawn initiatives. Therefore, it is advantageous to view 
Libya Dawn and Libya Shield as legacy organizations (though they are technically still 
active). Analysis of the subordinate umbrella organizations, such as the Shura Council of 
Benghazi Revolutionaries, is more telling of the evolving operational environment.  
1. Enter ISIS 
At the time of this writing, ISIS has officially expanded its territory into Libya 
and Egypt, which is its first attempt to obtain non-contiguous territory. Libya, through its 
porous borders, sympathetic population, and lack of policing, has long been known to 
support the global jihad movements of AQ and ISIS. Figure 7 shows a tweet and message 
aimed at potential ISIS recruits, suggesting that Libya is a worthwhile venture and one 
should fight in the name of ISIS in Libya.179  
179 Gilad Shiloach, “ISIS to North Africans: Syria’s Too Far? Come to Libya,” Vocativ, last modified 
January 16, 2015, http://www.vocativ.com/world/libya/isis-inviting-north-africans-syria-far-come-libya/. 
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 Figure 7.  ISIS Recruitment for Libya180  
ISIS has already made inroads in Libya, particularly with the Dernah-based group 
Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam (MSSI). MSSI turned former government buildings into 
ISIS offices and began providing public goods within the city; however it is not without 
competition. The Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade proclaimed that they will “never pledge 
baya (a religiously binding oath of allegiance) to anyone outside Libya.”181 ISIS has 
appointed two emirs for eastern and western Libya: a Yemeni by the name of Mohammad 
Abdullah (alias Abu al-Baraa al Azdi) as the emir of the east and, in the west, a Tunisian 
named Abu Talha.182  
Aside from expanding the domain of the caliphate, it is difficult to determine what 
the true intent is for ISIS in entering Libya and Egypt. Since their arrival in Libya, some 
of their attention has been on recruiting members of AAL. This line of effort has not been 
overly successful, due to existing alliances between AAL and other Islamist organizations 
in Libya. That being said, it is likely that AAL will experience some fissures in their 
organization between the extreme believers and the more nationalistically aligned 
fighters. Gaining the influence of AAL will bolster ISIS’s standing within Libya, 
180 Shiloach, “ISIS to North Africans,” Vocativ.  
181 Zelin, “The Islamic State’s First Colony.”  




                                                 
particularly against a government already in the midst of civil war, and expand ISIS’s 
access to areas outside of Dernah. 
Other possibilities exist as well. Another conjecture holds that ISIS needs to 
establish a foothold in either Libya or Egypt to extend its reach into Europe. Many 
Libyans fleeing the country have already gained access to Europe via Italy—an 
immigration route that ISIS could use as well. Another argument is that Libya can 
provide resources that ISIS needs, specifically oil for revenue and stockpiles of military-
grade weapons systems left over from the Gaddafi regime.183  
Oil is always a contentious issue. Coalition airstrikes in Iraq are not only targeting 
ISIS fighters and equipment, but also refineries, which has caused ISIS fighters to offset 
the loss by increasing taxes on the population to sustain operations. ISIS in eastern Syria 
refines and smuggles 50,000 barrels a day for a return of several million dollars a day.184 
It is possible that ISIS is drawn to Libya purely for its oil and high capacity for 
smuggling operations, which Libyans learned from years of smuggling subsidized goods 
under Gaddafi.  
What appears to be most likely purpose behind ISIS’s arrival in Libya is all of the 
above. ISIS already sees AAL support as critical to gaining access throughout Libya. 
ISIS is not only focused on population centers, but they have also dispatched fighters to 
control resources. And freedom of operations in Libya provides them with the ability to 
project power into Europe if they choose. ISIS has already denounced every organization 
in Libya that has not pledged allegiance to itself, including moderate Islamists. Thus, far, 
the only alliances ISIS has been able to establish in Libya are with MSSI and with 
individual hardliners who defected from moderate Islamist organizations.  
183 Michael, “ISIS Militants,” The Daily Star. 
184 Mitchell Prothero, “As Airstrikes Damage Islamic State, it Seeks ‘Money, Money, Money,’” 
McClatchy DC, March 3, 2015, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/03/03/258428/as-airstrikes-damage-
islamic-state.html.  
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2. Islamist Organizations  
Reflecting the fluid nature of Islamist relationships, nationalistic and jihadist 
groups are consolidated in Table 3. As a rule, Islamist groups with a more nationalist 
ideology are listed first and jihadist organizations appear last. Islamist forces have also 
created their own umbrella organizations. The umbrella organizations, like the Shura 
Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, may contain both nationalist and Jihadist Islamists, 




Table 3.   Islamist Organizations  
Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
Libya Dawn (Fajr 
Libya)185 
Umbrella organization for both 
regional and Islamist organizations. 
Opposed to the HoR, support the 
MB’s JCP, and favor the political-
isolation law (recently repealed). 
Known for initiating Operation 
Dawn, the attack on Zintani forces 
at Tripoli airport in July 2014.  
Defend Islamist 
groups linked to 







LROR; Zawiay militias, 
Libya Central Shield 
Force; allied with AAL 




Started circa June 2014 with strong 
Islamist views. Declared Benghazi 
part of the Islamic emirate. Known 
for expelling the al-Saiqah special 
forces from Benghazi and 
establishing the Islamic emirate. 
Establish sharia as 
the sole source of 
law 
Military leader: Wisam 





Libya Shield BDE 1; 17 
February BDE; Rafallah 
Sahati BDE; possible 
associations with Jaysh 
Al-Mujahideen; AAL 
  
185 Mitchell, “Islamist & Misrata Forces (1),” Red Team Analysis Society. 
186 McGregor, “Libya’s Ansar al-Shari’a,” Terrorism Monitor, 8-9. 
187 Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, last accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.libproxy.nps.edu/group/ansar-al-
sharia-libya-asl. 
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Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
Libya Shield 
BDE 1188 
Subordinate organization of Libya 
Shield, primarily responsible for 
security in the Benghazi region. 
Moderate Islamist beliefs. Gen. 
Hiftar’s Operation Dignity drove 
group towards hardline Salafists to 




Wisam Bin Hamid 
 
SCBR and sub-groups; 
AAL  
Rafallah al-Sahati 
BDE aka Libya 
Shield BDE 2189 
Named after a martyr of the 
17February revolution, started as a 
subordinate unit to the 17 February 
Martyrs BDE and now under the 
umbrella of Benghazi Revolutionary 
Operations Room. Assessed to have 
1,000 fighters concentrating on 
police efforts in eastern Libya and 
Kufra (south). Claim to have warned 
the U.S. mission in Benghazi of 








SCBR and sub-groups; 
AAL  
  
188 Jon Mitchell, “War in Libya and its Futures: State of Play – Islamist Forces (2),” Red Team Analysis Society, last modified January 26, 2015, 
https://www.redanalysis.org/2015/01/26/war-libya-futures-state-play-islamist-misrata-forces-2/ 
189 “Non-State Armed Groups,” Jane’s, 6-7. 
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Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
17 February 
Martyrs BDE190 
Originally a policing force in 
eastern Libya under Benghazi 
Revolutionary Operations Room, 
but disassociated with the central 
government and aligned with 
Islamists. Reportedly 1.5–3,000 
members. Self-proclaimed as the 
best armed militia, with anti-aircraft, 
and man-portable air-defense 
system (MANPADS). Were 
responsible for the protection of the 











Composed of former members of 
LIFG and named after Gaddafi 
prison. Partners with AAL (not an 
alliance). Operates predominantly in 
Dernah. Reportedly at odds with 
Islamic Youth Shura Council 
because of clashing ideologies and 
assassinations of Abu Salim Martyrs 
BDE leadership.192 
Establish sharia as 







Council of Dernah, 
associated with AAL 
  
190 Ibid., 6. 
191 Ibid., 7-9. 
192 Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.libproxy.nps.edu/group/abu-slim-martyrs-
brigade.  
 70 
                                                 




Best known for attack on Benghazi 
consulate, operates primarily out of 
Benghazi, Dernah, Sirte, and 
Ajdabiya. Funnels fighters into 
Syria and Iraq, locally helps solve 
community problems. Reports 
suggest ties between ISIS and AAL 
are tenuous, though other reports 
suggest that AAL is a willing 
participant. This contradiction may 
be attributed to AAL’s being a 
syndicate of two groups: Ansar al 
Sharia in Dernah (AAS-D) and 
Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi (AAS-
B). AAS-D may be sympathetic to 
ISIS ideology, whereas AAS-B may 
have a negative relationship. An 
unconfirmed report suggests ISIS 
killed the AAS-B Amir Muhammad 
Al-Zahawi; ISIS has increased AAL 
recruitment efforts since the death. 
Establish sharia as 
sole source of law  
Ahmed Abu Khattalah; 
Muhamed Ali al-
Zahawi; and Sufian Ben 
Qumu (Ansar al Sharia 





17 February Martyrs 





193 “Non-State Armed Groups,” Jane’s, 5-6. 
194 Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.libproxy.nps.edu/group/ansar-al-sharia-
libya-asl. 
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Shura Council of 
Dernah)195  
Started in December 2014 by Abu 
Salim Martyrs BDE. Group founder 
and leader, Shaykh Salim Derby 
gave a speech announcing the new 
alliance and gave colleagues in 
Benghazi, the Shura Council of 
Benghazi Revolutionaries, a vow of 
support. Aside from the Abu Salim 
Martyrs BDE, it is unclear who else 
is a member of the Dernah- based 
Islamist alliance. The Abu Salim 
Martyrs BDE is at odds with MSSI. 
Counter- Hiftar 
Force; wants to 
establish sharia as 
the sole source of 
law  
Shaykh Salim Derby 
Abu Salim Martyrs BDE; 
Shura Council of 
Benghazi Revolutionaries; 
Factions of unconfirmed: 





AKA Islamic Shura Youth Council, 
known for officially establishing the 
Islamic Emirate in Dernah in 
November 2014. Declared 
allegiance to IS in June, in October 
claimed Dernah for IS, and was 
accepted in November. Has 
incorporated ISIS-style propaganda 
into daily activities. Fighting force 
consists of locals who travel to Syria 
and Iraq for jihad. 
Incorporate Libya 
in caliphate; 
believes there is no 
room for Islam and 
democracy 
Abu Taleb al-Jazrawey 
(Yemeni)197 
ISIS, Battar BDE 
195 Mitchell, “Islamist Forces (2),” Red Team Analysis Society. 
196 Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.trackingterrorism.org.libproxy.nps.edu/group/islamic-youth-
shura-council. 
197 “Islamic State Activity in Libya,” Kalam Institute for Network Science, last modified February 2, 2015, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/files/live/sites/almonitor/files/documents/2015/IS_Activity_in_Libya.pdf. 
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Name Summary Strategic Goal Leadership Affiliates 
Battar BDE198 
(ISIS) 
Consists of about 800 fighters, but 
began with 300 Libyans who 
returned from Syria and Iraq to 
begin an IS chapter. Reportedly has 
direct ties with IS leadership. 
Denounced the HoR, GNC, and 
regional militias and have expanded 
their reach from central Libya 
(Sirte) to Benghazi with additional 
pockets of influence in Tripoli and 
deep southern Tebu regions.  
Expand the 




Emir of Dernah and 
Eastern Libya: 
Mohammaed Abdullah 
aka Abu al-Baraa al 
Azdi (Yemeni) 
Emir of Tripoli and 






198 Matt Bauer, “Islamic State’s Libyan Expeditionary Force,” Center for Security Policy, last modified November 20, 2014, 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2014/11/20/islamic-states-libyan-expeditionary-force/. 
199 Maggie Michael, “Correction: Islamic State-Libya Story: How a Libyan City Joined the Islamic State Group,” ABC News Associated Press, February 19, 
2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/islamic-state-militants-find-foothold-chaotic-libya-29062839?singlePage=true/. 
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Gaddafi’s era of jamahiriya created systemic problems throughout the 
government and society. The Libyan economy has been inadequate since the mid-1980s 
and suffered under UN and Western sanctions. Once war broke out, the militias were 
drawn naturally to see control of the oil refineries, as they are financial lifeline of every 
institution in Libya. This is why the various militias discussed in this chapter have at 
minimum a tenuous relationship with the Petroleum Facilities Guard. 
Gaddafi’s abolition of political parties and isolation of Islamists had equally 
devastating impacts on the country. First, the lack of parties created weakness and 
indecision in the newly formed government and escalated tension in the country, due to 
power struggles. Furthermore, Gaddafi’s isolation of Islamism spawned insurgent groups 
like LIFG and created distrust of the government by groups in general and by Islamists 
especially, which resulted in the political-isolation law and like legislation and permeates 
the ideology of many terrorist groups today.  
Perhaps the most telling of consequences was a reliance on militias for security. 
The NTC and the GNC “have all at one time ‘registered’ or ‘deputized’ coalitions of 
armed groups” … and “what has arisen then can best be described as a hybrid security” 
sector.202 This hybrid security apparatus has deep roots in local affairs and, most 
importantly, is incapable of impartiality. Each group has its prejudices about other groups 
and government, which prevents any meaningful agreement. For example, General Hiftar 
will never be able to form an alliance with any Islamist group—even if he were so 
inclined.  
This chapter was more descriptive than analytical, by design. Gaining an 
understanding of the militias vying for power is an essential step in understanding the 
environment in Libya today. Chapter IV provides recommendations as to countering 
destabilizing agents in Libya. 
 
202 Frederic Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War: Reconciling, Politics Rebuilding Security,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, September 2014, 4. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
For every step forward, Libya takes two steps back. When Muammar Gaddafi was 
killed in October 2011 and the NTC was established, the world rejoiced at the potential of 
a new free society. The first set of elections took place about a year later and again the 
world looked on in hope, but the two main political parties, the JCP and NFA, were 
unable to reconcile their differences. To add insult to injury, PM Ali Zeidan was 
kidnapped by the LROR, which began to reveal the depth of mistrust in government. In 
2014 General Hiftar arrived and launched Operation Dignity, an anti-Islamist campaign 
that added more fuel to the JCP/NFA divide, sparking the formation of Libya Dawn, the 
Islamist anti-Hiftar movement, and setting a path towards civil war. Libya Dawn drew its 
membership both from Islamist groups and brigades aligned with the government-
affiliated Libya Shield. Ironically, those organizations that defected from Libya Shield to 
fight Hiftar and the de-facto Libyan army are still paid a salary from the HoR.203  
Following the elections in 2014, the country split between those who supported 
the HoR and those who supported the new parallel government, the GNC. The UN passed 
UNSCR 2174 in support of a comprehensive ceasefire to allow UN-brokered peace talks. 
However, shortly after UNSCR 2174, the Islamic State began making inroads in Libya. 
Just as General Hiftar’s arrival in 2014 strengthened some sectors of government while 
destabilizing others, this new wild card, the Islamic State, will similarly stress the fragile 
institutions of Libya. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Forty-two years of rule under Muammar Gaddafi disintegrated in eight short 
months; however, there is a glimmer of hope in “that despite everything that has gone 
wrong in Libya in the last three years, the country has seen an unbroken line of popularly 
elected bodies.”204 For these elected bodies to be successful, they will need to address 
203 Mitchell, “Islamist Forces (2),” Red Team Analysis Society. 
204 Ethan Chorin and Francis Ghiles, “In Libya, is Despair Key to a Turnaround?” Notes 
Internacionals CIDOB no. 97 (October 2014): 4. 
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three main drivers of instability: lack of trust, the Islamic State, and lack of economic 
reform. 
1. Addressing Lack of Trust 
Lack of trust has stymied cooperation and progress and intensified violence. For 
forty-two years, Muammar Gaddafi ingrained in the heads of every Libyan not to trust 
political parties, Islamists, or institutions. This social insecurity has manifested itself in 
contemporary Libya by lack of political dialogue, lack of security-sector reform, and. 
lack of rule of law. 
a. Lack of Political Dialogue 
The two main political parties are the JCP and the MB; after that, the remaining 
political parties are many, but diffuse as to influence. A process of national reconciliation 
must be initiated to bring opposing sides together. The UN, with historical bona fides 
from pressing for Libyan independence in the 1950s, has already made headway, with 
UNSCR 2174 bringing about negotiations and a forthcoming ceasefire. Current UN-led 
negotiations between the GNC and HoR in Morocco are hopeful, having established 
tangible goals of national unity and constitution building.  
Effective political dialogue will set the stage for all other reforms. The 
negotiations should establish a path for an inclusive government. This unified 
government needs to take a firm stance on terrorism while implementing a “face-saving 
formula that can bring the more pragmatic boycotting politicians from Misrata and the 
West into the fold.”205 Unity is the only way to dismantle Libya Dawn and Hiftar Forces, 
which are the primary combatants in the civil war. 
Another issue that must be addressed is the treatment of moderate Islamists. 
Islamists during the Gaddafi era were repressed, and in the contemporary environment, 
they are fearful that this history will repeat itself. Islamist militias played a key role in the 
17 February revolution and therefore “have a legitimacy born out of the position they 
205 Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War,” 28-29. 
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played in the struggle”206 that should not go unrecognized. The new Libyan constitution 
should formally acknowledge the Islamist contribution, as well as others, to the 17 
February revolution. Making their contributions part of recorded history will signal to the 
JCP that Islamist organizations will not be dissolved and that there is a place for their 
ideology in a democratic system. Furthermore, as Eric Hobsbawm might argue, Libya has 
the opportunity to invent a tradition of “social cohesion” between secularists and 
Islamists that would aid in “legitimizing institutions … [and] authority.”207 Taking steps 
to ensure social cohesion may help in reconciliation. 
Finally, the southern province of Fezzan is often overlooked, but is important to 
the stability of Libya. It contains the fossil water that supplies the north, has oil refineries, 
and is home to the Tubu. Racism against the black Tebus in the south has been 
historically rampant, and the Gaddafi regime stripped the Tubu of their citizenship. The 
Tubu fought alongside the revolutionaries, but the post-uprising government refused “to 
grant full identity cards to members of these [Tubu and Tuareg] communities,” denying 
them both citizenship and the right to vote.208 Libya already cannot control the flow of 
Tubu and Tuareg across the border from neighboring Sahel countries. The large 
population of Tubu and Tuareg throughout the Sahel is being drawn to Fezzan in the 
wake of instability. If racial discrimination is left unaddressed, the Libyan government 
risks alienating potential allies and creating new opposition to the state.  
b. Lack of Security Sector Reform 
Gaddafi established the RCs, which were able to supersede state authority, and by 
doing so divided formal and informal power. Militias and revolutionaries are continuing 
the same concepts, giving themselves immunity to formal laws.209 Libya Dawn and 
Hiftar forces are central to this conflict and must be brought into the fold. An option may 
206 Alison Pargeter, “Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya,” CTC Sentinel 6, no. 2 (2013): 
2. 
207 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 9. 
208 Howard, “Libya’s South,” 14. 
209 Barak Barfi, “Khalifa Haftar: Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down,” Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy Research Notes no22, (August 2014): 9-10. 
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be to transition regional militias into a type of national guard, where they would remain 
regionally aligned, but still accountable to the government. Historically, large countries 
have obtained large armies and navies by formalizing relationships with armed groups.  
In Libya’s case, Libya Dawn and Hiftar’s forces are the large armies that need to 
be formalized. While working through the legal system to hold accountable those units 
and groups that committed humanitarian-rights violations, a system must be in place to 
train newly integrated forces. It is important to remember that political dialogue and SSR 
are not mutually exclusive—SSR will not happen without political dialogue. Libya 
should also consider stopping payment to militias to force the function of SSR; however, 
this should only be done when there is a reintegration plan ready to be implemented.210  
General Hiftar is central to the issue of SSR. His presence and rhetoric inflame 
moderate Islamists, delegitimize the official military chain of command, and sow distrust 
in the population. If the Tobruk and Tripoli government are to give serious thought to 
reconciliation, Hiftar’s role must be marginalized. The informal power that Hiftar 
possesses can easily rival top leadership, and his impunity in actions taken against 
Islamists is a constant reminder of why the two sides will be unable to reconcile. Aside 
from having questionable political motives, his actions have created Libya Dawn and 
caused a civil war to spiral out of control. At a minimum, Operation Dignity will have to 
be called off and “forces under Hifter’s command [transferred] to the authority of the 
chief of staff of the army.”211 Libya must be prepared to part with Hiftar if it brings the 
HoR and GNC together in a unified government.  
 Reconciliation must “complement the constitution-making process; help build 
trust between various tribal, regional…and armed groups; and thereby facilitate 
disarmament.”212 Though DDR may be a lofty goal, armed groups will continue to 
delegitimize the authority of government through the conflation of formal and informal 
power. Libya is different than most states in the sense that SSR and DDR are closely 
210 Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War,” 31-33. 
211 Ibid., 28. 
212 Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the 
Future, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 80. 
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related—the majority of the people the government wants to disarm are the same security 
forces they want to reform. The government should empower local communities to lead 
decentralized SSR/DDR efforts. For example, given that Misrata will have political 
representation and a militia that is formally aligned to the central government, they could 
lead DDR efforts in Misrata. For DDR to work, the fighters turning in their arms must 
have options for an alternative source of income—otherwise they may gravitate towards 
illicit activity.213  
c. Lack of Rule of Law  
A survey of over 1,500 Libyan households indicated that despite the perceived 
weakness of security forces, most Libyans feel safe in their neighborhoods, which is 
attributed to their trust in “traditional leaders in resolving disputes and de-escalating 
clashes between families and tribes;” however, they still make formal complaints to 
security forces, which indicate “their desire for stronger state institutions.”214  
Reform of rule of law is significant for the future of Libya. Of all the sectors in 
Libya, “the unreformed character of a distrusted judiciary” remains the largest source of 
grievances.215 Fact-finding commissions should be established to weed out corrupt 
judiciary officials, bring closure to those who were targeted by Gaddafi, and end the 
human-rights abuses committed, with relative impunity, by militias.216 Following 
through on issues of rule of law will help redress popular grievances and strengthen 
formal authority over the informal authorities.  
In addition to fact-finding commissions, a committee should be created to 
determine whether Islamic courts should be considered for reinstatement. Historically, 
there has always been a high demand for a dual court system, and when they existed they 
were typically free from corruption. Admittedly, there was a difference between the 
judges of the old and the current judiciary. Previously those judges were professionally 
213 Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War,” 33. 
214 “Searching for Stability: Perceptions of Security, Justice, and Firearms in Libya,” Small Arms 
Survey Issue Brief no1 (August 2014): 7. 
215 “Trial by Error,” ICG, 39. 
216 Ibid. 
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trained (and at times the judges were European) and Libya had not yet hit its oil boom. 
Muammar Gaddafi appointed loyalists and used the revenue stream from oil to sustain 
that loyalty; yet the public demand for Islamic civil courts persisted, though they were 
forbidden. Formalizing a system that reaches rural areas that the formal government is 
unable to reach and allows communities to maintain some level of autonomy may help 
create interim stability.  
2. Addressing the Islamic State 
ISIS has become a formidable foe in the MENA. Because of the number of proxy 
battles that surround ISIS, and Libya for that matter, this recommendation is limited to 
domestic and regional actors only. Libya should entertain a domestic solution to which 
bordering countries can play supporting roles.  
Libya’s population at large did not support the LIFG or any extreme Islamist 
movement; however, these movements did find sympathetic populations in Benghazi, 
Dernah, Al-Bayda, and Ajdabiya.217 It is no coincidence that these are the same areas 
that ISIS is looking to expand into; these areas must be protected from further ISIS 
influence, as they are the most susceptible to its ideology. Thus, the first step is to deny 
traditional sanctuaries. Secondly, the Libyan government must hedge its bets and 
empower righteous groups, like the Mujahedeen Shura Council of Dernah and the Shura 
Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, to combat ISIS and MSSI. This focus and 
dedication will go a long way in ensuring that the east does not become a sanctuary for 
ISIS. If ISIS is allowed to fester and expand, Libya may not be able to deal with the 
problem, but if Libya assumes a proactive role in countering ISIS ideology, there is hope 
of success. Furthermore, Libya has to do everything in its power to prevent AAL from 
swearing allegiance to ISIS. AAL has pockets of influence throughout the country. If the 
majority of AAL joins ISIS, it could serve as the foothold ISIS needs to expand its 
influence throughout Libya. 
Securing the borders to prevent the flow of fighters and contraband is critical to 
stemming the spread of ISIS. The Tubu community “now has a dominant position in 
217 Brahimi, “Libya’s Revolution,” 617. 
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providing security at energy infrastructure, in border areas, and on key roads leading into 
Chad, Niger and Sudan.”218 If granting rights and citizenship, as mentioned earlier, is 
successful, then the Tebu (and likely the Tuareg) community may play an active role in 
securing Fezzan.  
Libya’s neighbors also have a critical role to play. Chad and Niger would benefit 
from focusing on their border security along the Libyan border, because the threat of ISIS 
can spread to their countries as well. In addition to that, the “EU Border Assistance 
Mission (EUBAM) is equipped for training and assisting the Libyan government,” but 
may require additional manning from the West.219 These options can assist in patching 
porous borders. 
Finally, Egypt and Algeria are two of the most powerful countries in North 
Africa. Egypt has already shown its willingness to attack ISIS locations in Libya; 
however, Algeria has to contend with its non-interference policy.220 It is in Algeria’s 
interests not to leave ISIS up to Libyan devices. Algeria can offer its counterterrorism 
expertise and reduce the chances of the Islamic State’s spreading across already porous 
borders. There is also a diplomatic option—Algeria’s government is “on good terms with 
Algeria’s Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic parties, which can serve as the connecting link 
to Libyan Islamists” during the reconciliation process.221 A strategic partnership between 
Egypt, Algeria, and Libya would prove beneficial in countering the spread of ISIS and 
stabilizing Libya.  
3. Addressing Economic Reform 
Libya’s economy has continued to ebb and flow throughout the post-Gaddafi 
years—something that is to be expected in a time of civil conflict. The main issue with 
Libya’s economy is that “public sector salaries and subsidies form a greater proportion of 
218 Howard, “Libya’s South,” 14. 
219 Chivvis and Martini, Libya After Qaddafi, 84. 
220 Yacine Boudhane, Algeria’s Role in Solving the Libya Crisis,” Fikra Forum, August 28, 2014, 
http://fikraforum.org/?p=5315.   
221 Ibid. 
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the state budget today” than in the pre-revolutionary period.222 Of Libyans who are 
employed, 80 percent are state employees, most of which belong to a sponsored armed 
group, and 60 percent of the country’s budget is allocated to paying salaries and 
subsidies. The remaining 40 percent is allocated towards debt.223  
Economic reform is predicated on security. Libya needs to attract foreign 
investors to help create jobs, build infrastructure, and professionalize the economic 
industry. One method is to develop charter cities where “imported stability” is 
accomplished through outsourcing “good governance in that city or zone in order to 
accomplish a specific goal, often economic.”224 The private sector can be a powerful 
partner to the Libyan government; once invested, they will generally form a symbiotic 
relationship with the government, since it is in both their interests to be as successful as 
possible. Furthermore, Libya must protect its economic assets from potential threats, such 
as ISIS and competitors within its own government. ISIS likely has plans to take 
advantage of Libyan oil wealth to convert that resource into organizational profits.  
An internal solution for economic reform must include a purposeful move away 
from Gaddafi-era practices. Libya’s main cash crops–oil and natural gas—need to return 
to pre-war levels. Currently the industries are state run, which has drawbacks. One 
problem is the potential of appointing leaders based on relationships and patronage. This 
was an institutional weakness of the Gaddafi regime, and oversight must be emplaced to 
ensure that old practices do not return. On the other end of the spectrum, instead of hiring 
based on patronage, a state-run facility may offer an easy venue for the population to 
work in, leading to over-manning. Hiring more employees may allow Libya to boast low 
unemployment, but it can reduce profitability and ultimately lower wages. Libya does not 
need to go the route of privatization, which risks returning to the status of a rentier state. 
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Rather, business rules for extracting resources must be explicit and transparent, with 
proper oversight commissions to reduce the possibility of corruption.225  
Gaddafi built a system of reliance and patronage. Regulatory and oversight 
commissions must be established to ensure the economic system is free of abuse; this 
must be predicated on trust in the judiciary. Furthermore the population must be taken off 
its dependency on subsidies. In 2012, about 25 percent of Libya’s GDP was paid out in 
subsides. Not only does abusing subsidies hurt the economy, it also feeds into the larger 
security dilemma by encouraging smugglers and the use of Libyan smuggling routes. 
Gaddafi’s abolition of need created a society that in hard times needed more and in good 
times wanted more. The need for more income drove the smuggling business and 
subsidized goods became the fuel that made the black market endure. Libya must figure 
out “how subsidies can be replaced by a more cost-effective social safety net.”226  
B. ROLES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The international community is left with a number of strategic options to help 
secure the borders, provide stability in Libya, and counter the threat of transnational 
terrorism. The following sections describe appropriate responses as they pertain to the 
West, the Islamic countries, and international organizations. Each of these members of 
the international community can play an integral role in bringing stability to the area.   
1. The Western World 
The West has had mixed emotions about the level of involvement they were 
willing to commit to Libya. NATO was quick to vacate the country following the death 
of Gaddafi and the United States has returned only under the cover of darkness to capture 
or kill high-value individuals belonging to AQ or AAL. The French appear to have taken 
the most aggressive stance of all towards the chaos in Libya.  
225 Christopher S. Chivvis, et al., Libya’s Post-Qaddafi Transition, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2012), 11-12. 
226 Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” 
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French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has repeatedly stated that the 3,000 
French stationed in the Sahel countries on a permanent basis “may need to attack 
militants in Libya,” and that he is actively seeking UN approval for potential action.227 
Western operations in Libya seem more likely with the expansion of ISIS into Libya. 
Selective targeting, with the approval of the UN, could allow the West to launch attacks 
against ISIS targets while maintaining a policy of non-interference in the Libyan internal 
conflict. From a U.S. perspective, “there is support among elements in Congress and the 
administration for actions against Islamic State wherever it operates, and for retribution 
against Ansar al-Shari’a.”228 Operations targeting ISIS can slow its span of control in 
Libya while allowing the GNC and HoR time to focus on reconciliation.  
The West can also influence longer-term impacts in Libya. The security forces in 
Libya were long neglected by Gaddafi and suffered a lack of professionalization. 
Between the United States, UK, Italy, and Turkey, over 15,000 Libyan troops are in 
training in Bulgaria.229 Professionalization of the military can yield far-reaching gains. It 
can offset the reliance on regional militia and turn the regional militia into a reserve or 
provincial force. It also helps bring legitimacy to the government. However, training is 
not enough—the West should do an assessment to determine whether the forces trained 
should be “equipped…and possibly mentored in action.”230  
2. The Islamic Nation-States 
Libya has drawn the attention of international Islamic nation-states, some of 
which have already been discussed. These states generally fall into either the pro– 
Operation Dignity camp or the pro– Libya Dawn camp, for purposes that run from 
ideological alignment to global economics. Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are aligned 
with the pro-Dignity, side providing money and air-strike capability. The anti-Dawn 
227 Richard Reeve, “Libya’s Proxy Battlefield,” Oxford Research Group, January 2014, 
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backing comes from regional states such as Niger, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, 
“which have little capacity to intervene inside Libya but have been actively lobbying the 
UN” for an over aching pan-Sahel counterterrorism strategy.231  
On the other side are Qatar and Turkey. They have been accused by Libyan PM 
Abdullah al-Thinni of supplying weapons and materiel support to pro-Dawn Islamist 
groups.232 The dynamic among Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar has 
expressed a larger proxy battle among the countries’ differing ideologies. Turning a blind 
eye, the security council “has done little to question the breach of UN arms embargo that 
has allowed Egypt, Russia and others to arm Operation Dignity,” despite the 22 
September 2014 non-interference pact.233  
Morocco is slated to host a round of negotiations and can assist in minimizing the 
impact of the proxy war by using its relationship with Qatar and Turkey to discourage 
them from exacerbating the conflict in Libya. Morocco could ask Qatar to denounce 
Islamists who are gravitating towards Libya. The difficulty resides with convincing Egypt 
and UAE that the JCP is a better alternative to ISIS or another extreme form of Islam.234  
3. International Organizations  
The UN is leading the effort for political dialogue between the GNC and HoR to 
discuss peace and reconciliation. The negotiations, moderated by UN special 
representative of the secretary general Bernardino Leon, started in mid-January 2015 and 
have thus far been fruitful. The next round of talks, scheduled for March, will address the 
formation of a unified government; security arrangements, to include ceasefire, 
231 Reeve, “Libya’s Proxy Battlefield,” 2014.  
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withdrawal, and disarmament/arms control; and the completion of a constitution.235 
Facilitating these talks should be the first priority of the United Nations support mission 
in Libya (UNSMIL), as a peaceful resolution will put an end to a civil war that is 
spiraling out of control. As mentioned earlier, if Morocco is capable of convincing the 
Arab states to end their proxy battles, negotiations will have a higher chance of success. 
The alternative is to let Libya collapse, much like Somalia, with which it shares similar 
problems of armed groups, Islamists, fractious governmental groups, and missed 
opportunities for peace.236 
The UN must also be cognizant of the previous regime’s mistakes. Too often, 
Libyans have repeated Gaddafi’s failed policies. As discussed in Chapter III, the 
political-isolation law and Law 37 were examples of the government’s resorting to 
repressive tactics; these laws were present during the first UN-advised transition to the 
NTC. A “lack of innovation…[produces] the same problematic environment that had 
caused the conflict in the first place.”237 The UN should recognize these pitfalls and 
exercise caution.  
The UN has the ability to press for better support in EUBAM. EUBAM has 
suffered from a lack of volunteers, and the complicated political structure in Libya makes 
it difficult for EUBAM to operate and train border forces.238 Though border security is 
only a supporting effort, at this juncture in Libya’s revolution, its byproduct is a more 
professional border force and better understanding of the potential threats that flow 
through the porous borders.  
Finally, the UN must consider deploying a stabilization force, particularly as part 
of or subsequent to the forthcoming ceasefire. The mandate for the force must be limited 
to discrete tasks, such as protecting infrastructure, enabling democratic processes, and 
235 “UNSMIL Announces Libyan Political Dialogue to Resume this Week, Calls for Immediate 
Ceasefire,” UNSMIL, last Modified March 03, 2015, 
http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=3543&mid=6187&ItemID=2006857. 
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responding to humanitarian violations. A tailored scope allows the UN to project realistic 
and achievable troop requests. The chances for success of a stabilization force are high, 
because members of the Misrata and Zintani militias and the SSC support a stabilization 
force if the force consists of neutral parties, such as a Scandinavian country or 
Australia.239  
C. CONCLUSION 
Libya is a vector for violence, held together by loosely formed coalitions of 
militias. Historically, isolation from the West, coupled with the intentional weakening of 
political institutions, created a social capital deficit that would carry over into the 17 
February Revolution. Libya has since devolved into civil war and is at risk of becoming a 
failed state and destabilizing the region. ISIS has used the fog of war to make headway 
into Libya and begun a campaign of violence, recruiting, and seizing territory in the name 
of the global caliphate. The deleterious effects of the turmoil in Libya are far reaching, 
but not insurmountable. 
This study concentrated on Libya’s evolution from an independent state, to a state 
under Gaddafi, and thence to a state in the throes of civil war. The purpose of this 
research is to assist stability efforts by examining Libya’s recent history and identifying 
systemic issues with bureaucratic and economic institutions, security, rule of law, and 
society.  
Too often, Western thinking defaults to Western solutions. This study focused on 
finding a Libyan solution to Libya’s instability, recommending that Libya must reconcile 
their lack of social trust in political parties, among competitive militias, and in public 
institutions and then turn their attention to ISIS and economic reform. The UN will play a 
crucial role in brokering a resolution between the governments in Tobruk and Tripoli. 
Only by confronting the practical realities of Libya’s history, culture, and people can a 
lasting and equitable peace be designed and maintained. 
239 Wehrey, “Ending Libya’s Civil War,” 29-30. 
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D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future efforts should focus on the specifics (at a micro, not macro, level) of 
bringing stability to Libya. These findings could then be combined with an international 
application; for example, by finding a successful model for a dual Islamic and state court 
system that can provide a framework for Libya’s judiciary and ensure a Libyan solution.  
Another area that needs more development is the process of reconciliation. The 
literature generally agrees that the two sides (JCP/NFA) need to reconcile, but offers very 
little in how to accomplish this task. DDR and SSR are often cited, but these do not get to 
the central issue of why the militias, armed groups, and VEOs exist in the first place. 
Applying practical guidelines in how states can take unaffiliated militias and turn them 
into long-term actors for the state would prove beneficial.  
The prospect of Libyan federalism was not examined in this study. A weaker 
central government in Libya may help reduce the use of regional militias. If the central 
government can agree to exercise control over gas and oil, meanwhile allowing the 
provinces to remain relatively autonomous—with a stipulation for collective defense– 
this arrangement may be palatable for all parties.  
Libya is at a tipping point and reducing the trust deficit is at the core of the issues 
Libya faces today. Before improving the civilian and industrial sectors, security must be 
established, followed by the repurposing of militias. The current UN-led negotiations are 
a positive step that signifies hope for Libya. Solutions must be found to reconcile 
differences, or both the GNC and the HoR will be fighting a war on two fronts: against 
each other, and against ISIS, which thrives in unstable regions and will grow stronger as 
civil war continues. Alternatively, as a house divided, Libya will fail and become a 
regional vector for instability.  
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